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IV 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the possible problems and potential benefits that the Polish 
Government and the Polish Ministry of National Defense (PMND) might experience if 
these institutions implemented a system similar to the US Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS). The thesis provides an overview of the PPBS at the Depart- 
ment of Defense level including a description of the main participants. It also provides a 
comparison of the different processes used by the US services. This is followed by a 
thorough description of the Polish Budgetary System. The analysis of the two systems 
reveals several significant differences. These differences stem from the laws, national 
interests and finally from the different structures of the armed forces. Even with these 
differences, the analysis shows several potential benefits that support incorporating a sys- 
tem based on the PPBS. These benefits include, a strategic planning approach toward 
managing scarce resources, long-term planning, and efficiencies that would ensue in the 
defense industry. Finally, a recommendation is made to implement a system similar to the 
PPBS in the Polish Ministry of National Defense. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis analyzes the possible problems and benefits that the Polish Government and 
the Polish Ministry of National Defense (PMND) might experience if these institutions imple- 
mented a system like the US Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) in the Pol- 
ish Armed Forces. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The political changes that took place in Poland in 1989 caused tremendous shifts in the 
scope of public spending. One of these shifts was the change in national defense spending. There 
were huge reductions followed by slight increases in defense funding during the last decade. 
[Ref. 15] These increases, however, did not help the Polish Armed Forces modernize. There 
were several very ambitious modernization plans such as Program Armed Forces 2012 [Ref. 9] 
and the present plan of modernizing the Armed Forces before 2006. [Ref. 10] However, these 
plans were based upon savings, which the Armed Forces had to achieve before the changes could 
be implemented. 
Program Armed Forces 2012 was created by the Chamber of Ministers under Prime Min- 
ister Cimoszewicz in 1997. It was then introduced into law after a few changes in 1998 by Prime 
Minister Buzek. This program assumed the Polish Armed Forces would be composed of between 
ninety-five thousand to one hundred and seven thousand soldiers. The final number would de- 
pend on the decision of the Minister of National Defense. The plan assumed other structural 
modernizations of the Polish Armed Forces and enhancement offerees selected to be the first to 
join NATO. 
Program Armed Forces 2012 was rejected two years after its implementation owing to in- 
sufficient funds to conduct the changes. In addition, there were many questions and doubts about 
the way the plan was initially prepared and about its congruence with NATO's goals that had 
been submitted to Poland as prerequisites for its joining NATO. 
The current modernization program for the Polish Armed Forces will require six years. 
During that period, PMND intends to make one third of the Polish Armed Forces equal in quality 
to the average army of the NATO members. In addition, there will be some changes in the per- 
sonnel profile of the army. However, this modernization program, like the previous one, is based 
on funds from savings made within PMND. This funding will likely originate from closing of 
garrisons and the dismantling of various units. This program did result in at least one definite 
benefit by setting a fixed percentage of GDP for defense spending (1.95 percent of GDP). 
The current budgetary system in Poland lacks multiyear budgeting. Although planning is 
made for the long term, specific amounts of money are not allocated for programs past the 
budget year. For example, Program Armed Forces 2012 was a long-term plan, spanning fifteen 
years (1997-2012) yet, budgeting for the Program Armed Forces 2012 was based on savings to 
be achieved within the Polish Ministry of National Defense. Some estimates about possible sav- 
ings were made, but the magnitude of the tasks facing the Ministry outweighed their means of 
executing them. 
The Polish Ministry of National Defense will consider adopting a system similar to the 
American PPBS (Planning, Programming and Budgeting System) as a proposed solution. A 
complex system composed of three phases, PPBS establishes a framework for making decisions 
on future programs. 
C.      SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope of this thesis will include: (1) a review of the PPBS, (2) a description of the 
budgetary system currently used in Poland, and (3) an in-depth examination of the problems and 
prospects for changing existing organizations and processes in Poland to implement a PPBS-like 
system. 
The methodology used in this thesis consists of the following steps. 
1. A literature search of books, journal articles, and other publications about the PPBS and the 
Polish budgetary system. 
2. Identification of significant problems anticipated in adopting the PPBS in Poland. 
3. Identification of potential avenues for changing PMND and other Polish governmental or- 
ganizations and processes. 
4. Presentation of recommendations associated with shifting defense budgeting in Poland to- 
ward a PPBS-like system, and possible approaches and advantages for implementing a 
PPBS-like system. 
D.      ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The thesis has the following format. The first chapter briefly explains why the thesis is 
being written. The first section of the chapter describes the reasons why the Polish Government 
and Polish Ministry of National Defense should implement a PPBS-like system to replace the 
existing system. The chapter also explains how the problem will be examined. 
Chapter II describes the PPBS. The first section traces the brief history of the PPBS and 
its goals. The second section describes the major components of the PPBS, namely, the Defense 
^Resources Board (DRB), the Program Review Group (PRG), and the Future Years Defense Pro- 
gram (FYDP). Each of these components is briefly described with particular attention paid to the 
tasks assigned and membership of each advisory group. The Future Years Defense Plan is de- 
scribed in more detail. The description outlines the structure of the FYDP and Major Force Pro- 
grams (MFP). 
Section C of Chapter II provides a detailed description of the PPBS system by dividing 
the system into particular phases. A short description of the activities in each phase is followed 
by a description of the main actors at the national level. The products issued during each phase 
are also described. 
Section D briefly analyses the differences among the branches of the U.S. military forces 
in their use of the PPBS. The last part of this chapter provides conclusions. 
Chapter III describes the budgetary system of the Polish Armed Forces. This chapter be- 
gins with a section describing the legal basis of the Polish budgetary system. Then the budgetary 
procedures employed at different levels of budget formulation are examined. The initial level of 
the budgetary process describes how the Polish Ministry of National Defense develops its budget 
proposal. The next level describes how the Government of Poland develops both the state and the 
defense budgets. The last level describes Parliamentary procedures for establishing the state 
budget. A subsection describing the execution of the defense budget closes section B. 
Control over the execution of the budget is the subject of Section C. This section includes 
the control by both governmental agencies and by the Polish Ministry of National Defense. 
Chapter IV is devoted to analyzing the problems that might be incurred and the benefits 
that could be realized if the Government of Poland and the Polish Ministry of National Defense 
(PMND) decided to implement a PPBS-like system within the PMND. The first subsection of 
Chapter IV presents possible problems related to differences in laws in the U.S. and in Poland. 
Other problems involve the different scope of national interest between Poland and the U.S. 
These differences are reflected by different structures of the military forces. Finally, there are 
additional problems associated with the vast differences in the structures of the militaries them- 
selves. The next subsection presents some advantages that would be generated if Poland imple- 
mented a PPBS-like system. This subsection concentrates on two dimensions: economic advan- 
tages and military advantages. 
The last chapter presents the author's conclusions and recommendations. This chapter 
also proposes further areas of studies that might provide interesting topics for future theses. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
II.      THE PPBS SYSTEM 
A.      INTRODUCTION 
The ultimate objective of the DoD PPBS is to provide the best mix of forces, 
equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints. 
DoD directive 7045.17 
The purpose of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is to allocate 
resources within the Department of Defense. This is the DoD's primary resource management 
system. The PPBS was first introduced into the Department of Defense in the early 1960's dur- 
ing Mr. McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). The PPBS is a cyclical process 
including three distinct but interrelated phases: planning, programming, and budgeting. Figure 
II-1 presents the general idea of the PPBS. 
The planning phase establishes potential threats for programs to counter and defines na- 
tional defense policies, objectives, strategy, and guidance for the upcoming programming phase 
regarding resources and force requirements to meet the stated threats and objectives. [Ref. 5] 
The programming phase translates planning decisions, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
programming guidance, and Congressional guidance into detailed allocation of time-phased re- 
source requirements including forces, personnel, and funds. Allocations are based on a six-year 
period. The budgeting phase focuses on the first two years of the six-year program, rearranges 
the programs under congressional appropriation groupings, and results in a two-year budget to 
Congress for approval.' 
1
 Department of the Army, Action Officers' Force Management Handbook, August 1999. 
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Figure II-l Scheme of the PPBS2 
Further sections present a detailed description of each phase. 
It is important to remember that although the PPBS process has three distinct phases, 
each phase overlaps the other phases. The first phase, planning and assessing, does not stop when 
it is done. On the contrary, it is continuous. Moreover, all participants in the PPBS must be 
aware of issues in their respective phase as well as in the other phases. Decisions made within 
one process affect the others. Therefore, all decision-makers should always be one step ahead to 
ensure that programs developed and funded are well balanced and executable. [Ref. 8] 
' http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/rm/ppbs/acronyms/ppb dur/ppb dur.html. 
The following sections of this chapter describe the major participants in the PPBS proc- 
ess (Section B) as well as the time-frame of the PPBS (Section C), detailing the activities occur- 
ring within each phase. 
B.      PPBS PARTICIPANTS 
1. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) is responsible for the centralized control of execu- 
tive policy through the three phases of the PPBS. To achieve this, the Secretary must make the 
major policy decisions, define planning goals, and allocate resources to support these objectives. 
These objectives include a combinations of goals, i.e. joint, DoD-wide, cross-DoD Component, 
and cross-command programs. The Defense Resources Board (DRB) supports the Secretary's 
efforts. [Ref 7] 
2. The Defense Resources Board (DRB) 
The Defense Resource Board assists the SECDEF in making major planning and pro- 
gramming decisions. This board participates in formulating and developing the SECDEF De- 
fense Planning Guidance (DPG) and reviewing the Service Program Objective Memoranda 
(POMs). 
The following lists the members of the DRB: 
• Chairman-DEPSECDEF; 
• Vice Chairman-Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); 
• Executive Secretary-Director, Program Analysis & Evaluation-OSD (PA&E); 
• Members-Service Secretaries; 
o   Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
o   Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics-USD 
(AT&L); 
o   Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-USD (P); 
o   Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller-USD (C); 
o   Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness-USD (P&R). 
The functions of the DRB include the following: 
• Considers broad policy and guides high priority objectives; 
• Reviews guidance for planning and programming; 
• Examines high priority programs; 
• Considers the effect of resource decisions on baseline cost, schedule, and performance of 
major acquisition programs and aligns the programs with the PPBS; 
• Helps tie the allocation of resources for specific programs and forces to national policies; 
• Reviews the program and budget; 
• Reviews the execution of selected programs; 
• Advises the SECDEF on policy, PPBS issues, and proposed decisions. [Ref. 11] 
3.      Program Review Group 
The Program Review Group has a highly important role during the programming phase 
of the PPBS. It develops and screens major issues before their presentation to the Defense Re- 
sources Board. [Ref. 4] 
The membership of the Program Review Group includes: 
• Chairman-Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation-OSD (D, PA&E); 
• Members: -Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller-PDUSD (C); 
o   Principal Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics- 
PDUSD (AT&L); 
o   Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command, Control, Com- 
munications & Intelligence-PDASD (C3I); 
o   Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management Policy-ASD (FM&P); 
o   Assistant Secretary of Defense Health Affairs-ASD (H); 
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o   Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs-ASD (R); 
o   Army Assistant Vice Chief of Staff; 
o   Navy Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resource, Warfare Requirements 
and Assessments)-N8; 
o   Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans & Programs); 
o   Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs & Resources); 
o   Joint Chiefs of Staff (Force Structure, Resources and Assessment)-J8.3 
The Chairman has the right to invite others to participate when necessary. [Ref. 11] 
C.      FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM 
A core element of the PPBS since its inception in the early 60's has been the concept of 
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). It is the most vital document in the PPBS. The 
FDYP is a database summarizing, over an eleven-year period, all resources associated with pro- 
grams approved by the SECDEF for DoD. The FYDP allows the DoD to make a multi-year fo- 
cus on resource allocation. Moreover, FYDP enables the creation of the President's Budget (PB) 
request to Congress. Congress also uses the FYDP. The FYDP is structured in different ways to 
reflect the needs of various end users. For Congress, the DoD's FYDP represents the allocation 
of money in terms of appropriations. In contrast, the DoD perceives the FYDP in terms of Major 
Force Programs (MFP). The DoD's FYDP is usually locked and published three times a year (six 
times during a two-year PPBS cycle). The following lists the periods when the FDYP is locked 
and published: 
• In May, to reflect the Service Program Objective Memorandum (POM) (even years) or 
Program Review (PR) (odd years) submission to the OSD; 
• In September, to reflect the Service Budget Estimate Submission (BES) to the OSD; 
'http://cno-n6.hq.naw.mil/N6E/PPBS/defauIt.htm. 
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•    In February, to reflect the OSD's PB submission to Congress. 
Even though the OSD maintains the "official" DoD FYDP database, each service main- 
tains its own separate FYDP database. Adding to the confusion, one can find different FDYP da- 
tabases maintained by different divisions. For example, the Navy's Programming Division (N80) 
and the Navy's Office of Budget/Fiscal Management Division (FMB) (often referred to as 
NAVCOMPT), maintain their own separate FYDP databases, N80's for the Programming Phase 
and FMB's for Budgeting. 
1.      The FYDP Structure 
The PPBS cycle projects funding for a six-year period. The FYDP is not a static database. 
By design and necessity, the FYDP is constantly changing to reflect new information. Because 
the PPBS is theoretically a two-year cycle, the OSD and each service department publishes its 
own FYDP six times every two years. In this theoretical two-year cycle, some elements of the 
PPBS, for example, the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), are prepared in even \ears 
while the Budget Estimate Submission (BES) and the President's Budget (PB) are prepared an- 
nually.4 
The odd years present a different situation. In these years, programming is not accom- 
plished, and the POM is not prepared. Documents prepared and updated are the BES and PB. 
The real world changes that affect the cost of approved programs are considered during the up- 
dating process. To reflect real world changes, the Program Review (PR) is conducted. The PR is 
prepared is the same manner as the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The only differ- 




A typical FYDP structure consists of eleven years. They are one-year prior, the current 
year, two budget years (called Biennial Budget Years), and the following four years (called Fu- 
ture Years or Out Years). The last three years present only a summary of force structure (no 
funds but end strength) and major force elements. Figure II-2 presents the structure of the FYDP. 
Figure H-2 Structure of the FYDP5 
The FYDP is organized in three main dimensions. The first dimension reflects the DoD 
interest represented by eleven Major Force Programs (MFPs). The second dimension reflects the 
Congress' interest in defense matters. All resources are allocated according to the authorization 
and appropriation processes of enacting budget authority. The third dimension represents re- 
source allocation by DoD components. The FYDP follows the rules of comprehensiveness and 
exclusiveness. This means that no single dollar can be in more than one MFP (exclusive), and 
every dollar in the DoD is in the MFP (comprehensive). Figure II-3 represents the three- 







Figure II-3 Three-Dimensional Structure of the FYDP6 
2.      Major Force Programs 
Major Force Programs are proposed sets of resources (people, money, forces from differ- 
ent DoD components). They exist to accomplish mission objectives established in the planning 
phase and reflected in the programming phase by particular programs. These programs reflect 
fiscal time phasing of mission objectives. 
There are eleven MFPs, as follows: 
• Strategic Forces 
• General Purpose Forces 
• C3I and Space 
• Airlift and Reserve Forces 
• Guard and Reserve Forces 
• Research and Development 
• Central Supply and Maintenance 
'http://cno-n6.hq.navy.mil/N6E/PPBS/default.htm. 
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• Training, Medical, and Other General Personnel Activities 
• Administration and Associated Activities 
• Support of Other Nations 
• Special Operations Forces 
These MFPs are also divided into subcategories, more detailed aggregations called Pro- 
gram Elements (PE). PEs are the primary data elements in the FYDP. PEs must be able to 
change in order to reflect any alterations that happen during the PPBS. Some estimates indicate 
that there are about five thousand PE's in day-to-day use. Another thousand are carried in the 
FYDP database, but are "inactive." [Ref. 16] The further division of MFPs is beyond the scope 
of this thesis and will not be presented here. 
D.      THE PPBS SYSTEM 
The PPBS is perceived as the heart of the defense resource-allocation process. It estab- 
lishes the framework and provides the mechanisms for decision making for the future. The PPBS 
also provides the chance to re-examine prior decisions in light of the present environment. It is a 
cyclic and iterative process consisting of three distinct but interrelated and overlapping phases: 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting. Each of these phases contributes to the overall outcome 
of the PPBS process. Three phases and major elements of each phase are presented in 
Figure II-4. 
The following subsections will describe each phase of the PPBS and its main players and 
products. First, the planning phase will be described, followed by the programming phase. The 
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Figure II-4 PPBS Process with Main Items7 
1.      Planning Phase 
The planning phase of the PPBS translates top-down guidance into meaningful plans and 
requirements for which a program for the FYDP can be developed. It defines and examines al- 
ternative strategies and analyzes external conditions and trends. One can distinguish two levels 
of planning: national level planning and services' level of planning. This sub-subsection will de- 
scribe only national level planning, including the players and products of this phase. 
The national level planning involves groups and players beyond the particular service. 
These groups include the OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Unified Commanders-in- 
Chief (CINCs), and non-DoD organizations such as the Department of State, the Central Intelli- 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/rm/ppbs/ppbs.html. 
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gence Agency (CIA), the National Security Council (NSC), etc. Figure II-5 presents the timeline 
and major players of the Planning Phase. 
Planning 
mmsmmammmmnm** 
Question: How Much Defense Is Enough? 
Objective: Develop Guidance For Structuring Forces & 
Establishing Priorities. 
Responsibility: USD { Policy) / D (PA&E) 
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Figure H-5 The Timeline and Main Players of the Planning Phase 
a)        National Level Planning-Main Actors 
(1) National Security Council (NSC)—The National Security Council is 
the highest body in the strategic planning hierarchy. Its task is to prepare the National Security 
Strategy (NSS), which, with presidential approval, establishes a national security policy. The 
President of the United States is obliged to submit the NSS together with the PB to the Congress. 
The NSS along with other policy decisions provides the DoD with the basis for the planning and 
programming processes. 
Picture taken from the presentation by Professor Robert J. Bohls Sr. titled "Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
System," Defense Systems Management College, Ford Belvoir, Virginia, 1998. 
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(2) Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)—Although the SECDEF plays an 
important role in the whole PPBS process, the role of the SECDEF is described in subsection B. 
(3) Policy Secretariat (Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Policy)— 
The USD (Policy) is the principal OSD staff assistant for formulating national security and de- 
fense policy and for integrating and overseeing DoD policy and plans to achieve national secu- 
rity objectives. The USD (Policy) is the primary advisor to the SECDEF for the planning phase 
of the PPBS and, together with the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), drafts 
the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).9 
(4) Defense Resource Board (DRB)—The role and tasks as well as the 
composition of Defense Resource Board were presented earlier in this chapter. 
(5) Defense Planning Advisory Group (DPAG)—The DPAG has a sig- 
nificant role in the planning phase of the PPBS by supporting the development of the Defense 
Planning Guidance (DPG). The group is co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Strategy and Threat Reduction and the Director of PA&E. The members of this group include 
senior planners and resource managers from OSD, the Services, and the Joint Staff. 
(6) Combatant Commanders (Unified CINCS)—The CINCs are the war- 
fighters who execute the military strategy. That fact makes them very important as the inputs for 
the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and PPBS. The CINCs, together with the Services, 
fully participate as active members in creating the JSPS documents such as the National Military 
Strategy (NMS), the Joint Planning Document (JPD), and the Chairman's Program Recommen- 
dations (CPR). The CINCs annually submit their Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs). IPLs, along 




Submitted by the CINCs, IPLs affect the development of the JSPS documents significantly. In 
turn, these products of the JSPS support the Chairman's programmatic and budgetary advice to 
the SECDEF. They also influence the Service Program Objective Memorandums (POMs). The 
main purpose of submitting IPLs is to articulate detailed funding requirements of component 
CINCs to their respective services. The CINCs also provide a great deal of input to the assess- 
ment phase of JSPS through participation in the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment 
(JWCA) process. As they can articulate their demands to the respective services, the CINCs can 
also review the Services' POMs to ensure they address their requirements. The CINCs can also 
participate in the DRB deliberations and submit their issues to the DRB. 
(7) Joint Chiefs of Staffs (JCS)—The primary contributor to DoD plan- 
ning is the JCS, who accomplishes this contribution through the Joint Strategic Planning System 
(JSPS). The JSPS is the formal manner through which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS), after consultations with the other members of the JCS and the CINCs, discharges his 
responsibility. The major part of the JSPS is the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment 
(JWCA). The JWCA provides a systematic view of future joint fighting capabilities. Assess- 
ments of these capabilities, sponsored by Joint Staff Directorates, are conducted by teams of war- 
fighting and functional area experts from many functional levels of the DoD and other govern- 
mental agencies involved in the Planning phase. Assessments inquire into key relationships be- 
tween joint warfighting capabilities and define opportunities for improving warfighting effec- 
tiveness. Results are presented to the CJCS, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), 
and the Unified CINCs. The final assessment results are exploited to influence programming and 
budget guidance and to prepare joint requirement resource recommendations. 
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The JWCA is an annual, cyclical process providing key assessments to the 
CJCS to prepare the Chairman's Program Recommendations (CPR), the Joint Planning Docu- 
ment (JPD), and the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA). These three documents support the 
SECDEF's development of Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). A detailed description of the 
JWCA process will not be provided here because it is outside the scope of this thesis. 
(8) Military Departments (Services)—Military Departments affect the 
planning phase of the PPBS by participating in the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). They 
also contribute to the planning phase of the PPBS by contributing to the drafting of the Defense 
Planning Guidance (DPG). Being full participants in the JSPS allows the services to present their 
perspectives during the formulation of each of the JSPS documents. Simultaneously, the JSPS 
obtains the ongoing analyses conducted by the Services in the form of wargames, experiments, 
and other such studies. The Services are also part of the JWCA process, providing further input 
to the final assessment efforts of the JSPS that shape the strategic direction, plans, and program 
recommendations. 
(9) Agencies of the Department of Defense—The DoD agencies, much 
like the CINCs and Services, collaborate with others in the process of the JSPS, providing sig- 
nificant input, which is helpful in formulating the JSPS documents. The DoD agencies provide 
representatives to the various JWCA teams as required. 
b)        National Level Planning - Products 
(1) National Security Strategy (NSS)—The President of the United States 
is legally obliged to put forth to the Congress an annual report on the National Security Strategy 
(NSS) along with the President's Budget. The National Security Council generates and presents 
the NSS for the President to sign. 
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The NSS formulates the nation's main strategy and addresses ail elements 
of national power used to accomplish the national goals. This formal document provides general 
guidance both for developing the defense strategy that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) produces in the National Military Strategy (NMS) and to SECDEF for developing the 
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The NSS is not a document addressing national security in 
terms of the DoD or military alone. The portion of the NSS addressing military matters is written 
at an extreme macro level.10 
(2) National Military Strategy (NMS)—The CJCS submits the National 
Military Strategy (NMS). This document has various uses. It provides the President, the National 
Security Council (NSC) and the SECDEF with the Chairman's recommendations about the mili- 
tary strategy and force structure required to reach national security goals and objectives. The 
NMS helps the SECDEF prepare the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). It also provides the 
Services with supporting documents to be considered while the Program Objective Memoranda 
(POM) are developed. The format and intent of the NMS depend on the changes in the NSS and 
in the strategic environment that dictates the needs of the national strategy. Like the NSS, the 
NMS is written at an extremely macro level. 
(3) Joint Planning Document (JPD)—The Joint Planning Document pro- 
vides concise programming priorities, advice, and requirements to the Secretary of Defense for 
consideration while preparing the Defense Planning Guidance. The JPD is a complex document 
with a series of chapters concerning specific functional areas. Each Joint-Staff Director sponsor 
of a Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment prepares a chapter of the JPD responding to his 
http://cno-n6.hq.navy.mil/N6E/PPBS/default.htm. 
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area of responsibility. In doing this, each Director is supported by the Services, the CINCs, and 
the appropriate Defense agencies. The JPD includes the following chapters: 
• Chapter 1 - Intelligence: provides the information about the Chairman's view on intelli- 
gence planning policy and priorities; 
• Chapter 2 - Weapons of Mass Destruction: provides information about the nuclear ca- 
pabilities needs of the Combatant Commanders to meet the objectives of the NMS in the 
broad sense. 
• Chapter 3 - Command, Control, Communication and Computer (C4) Systems: identi- 
fies the essential capabilities of C4 systems to support objectives and goals of the NMS. It 
covers the period of the FYDP. 
• Chapter 4 - Future Capabilities: deals with broad issues concerning the use of advanced 
technology by the military. This chapter provides the strategic direction for major research 
and development efforts during the FYDP. It also identifies potential vulnerabilities associ- 
ated with the use of any advanced technology. 
• Chapter 5 - Manpower and Personnel: assesses current capabilities common to all Ser- 
vices to support current and programmed force levels and demands of the combatant com- 
manders. This chapter covers both military and civilian personnel needs. It also includes 
the necessary planning guidance to meet requirements through the entire planning period. 
• Chapter 6 - Strategic Mobility and Sustainment: identifies logistics capabilities to sup- 
port the objectives of the NMS. It also outlines requirements and vulnerabilities, including 
those identified by the combatant commands and Services. This chapter sets the priorities 
or the programs supporting current and projected requirements through the period of the 
FYDP. Guidance is integrated with programmatic priorities to ensure operational require- 
ments are met by the end of the planning period. 
• Chapter 7 - Theater Engagement and Presence Posture: presents the Chairman's thea- 
ter priorities and recommends planning and programming guidance on theater engagements 
outlined in the NMS. It is based mainly on the input from combatant commands. 
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•    Chapter 8 - Readiness: points out exact directions for planning and programming to ad- 
dress the resource requirements to support specific readiness issues affecting the combatant 
commands and Services.11 
(4) Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)—The Defense Planning Guidance 
(DPG) is the leading DoD planning document. It mirrors the President's prioritized National Se- 
curity Objectives from the National Security Strategy. The DPG provides the Services with the 
established policies that guide the Services through planning for peacetime, crises, and wartime 
strategies. The DPG decrees the criteria and assumptions for structuring forces and constitutes 
the priorities for dedicating resources for structuring forces and readiness, and sustainability ini- 
tiatives. The DPG is perceived as the major link between planning in the Joint Strategic Planning 
System (JSPS) and programming in the PPBS. It provides the military departments with the 
guidance and directions from the SECDEF for developing their Program Objective Memoranda 
(POM) for the defense planning period. The Defense Planning Guidance includes major planning 
issues and decisions, strategy and policy, strategic elements, the SECDEF's program planning 
objectives and other elements. It is used as a criterion for making programming and budgeting 
decisions. All Services develop their own program proposals in accordance with the DPG The 
OSD and Joint Staff use the DPG as a baseline for the Program Review. 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P)) and the Director 
Program Evaluation and Analysis are the two main OSD officials who are most invoK ed in cre- 
ating the Defense Planning Guidance. While drafting the DPG, they consider the previous year's 
DPG, Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs), and the budget, along with the National Military 
Strategy. The Defense Planning Advisory Group controls the whole process of drafting the DPG 
until the final version is reached. Developing the DPG depends on a dialogue between various 
"http://cno-n6.hq.navy.mil/N6E/PPBS/default.htm. 
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groups within the DoD, not to mention the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commanders, and the Ser- 
vices.12 
The ongoing revision of the drafted DPG occurs when particular chapters 
of the DPG are issued. The Services and other agencies and groups from the DoD are asked to 
review and comment on them. Drafts of particular chapters of the DPG are used by the Services 
to help develop their programs. The final draft of the DPG is sent to the Services and other DoD 
components in early March for coordination. The directions that the DPG provides to the Ser- 
vices are generally at a macro level. This is because the SECDEF places the primary responsibil- 
ity for program development and execution directly within the Services. The final version of the 
Defense Planning Guidance is issued about late March or April. 
(5) Integrated Priority Lists (IPL)—The Integrated Priority Lists are the 
documents by which the CINCs articulate their operational requirements, shortfalls, and specific 
concerns. The IPLs are required to be submitted to the SECDEF annually. Other copies are sent 
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services. The IPLs affect the formulation of 
the SECDEF's Joint Planning Document (JPD) and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The 
IPLs are also the key input to the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process. 
They also influence the formulation of the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and the 
Chairman's Program Recommendation (-CPR). Both of these items (the CPA and CPR) are asso- 
ciated with the JSPS and directly influence PPBS. IPLs are submitted by Unified CINCs at a 




of IPLs, each Service prepares issue papers, which provide the programmatic level of detail not 
present in the IPLs.13 
(6) Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR)—The Chairman's Pro- 
gram Recommendation is a document directly articulating the Chairman's personal recommen- 
dations to the SECDEF regarding priorities for the Defense Planning Guidance. While the JPD 
provides early planning and broad programmatic advice, the CPR appears later in the process, 
providing more detailed programmatic priorities and more specific recommendations on the pro- 
grams of the greatest concern to the Chairman. The main purpose of the CPR is to promote joint 
doctrine and training and to improve the joint warfighting capabilities. The input data is taken 
from the JWCA and the CINCs after a thorough discussion with the Joint Requirements Over- 
sight Council. The SECDEF can use all, part, or none of the CPR in the DPG. The CPR is usu- 
ally published in February or March, just before the DPG. 
2.      Programming Phase 
The publication of the Defense Planning Guidance and appropriate documents (e.g., 
Navy's Programming and Fiscal Guidance) indicate the end of the planning phase of the PPBS 
and begin the programming phase. The focus of the programming phase is developing the ser- 
vices' Program Objective Memoranda (POMs) and integrating these POMs into defense pro- 
grams that support the requirements of the CINCs. Figure II-6 presents the timeline and major 
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Figure II-6 The Timeline and Main Players of the Programming Phase14 
The individual who leads the programming phase is the Director, Program Analysis and 
Evaluation (D, PA&E) from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The main portion of the pro- 
gramming effort happens at the Service level. Each Service is obliged by law to develop its POM 
separately. In contrast, the OSD and JCS do not develop a POM. Their main contribution occurs 
during their respective and separate reviews of the Service POMs. This takes place after the 
POMs are submitted. The process of revision is called either the "Program Review" or the 
"Summer Review." 
a)        National Level-Main Players 
Some of the players involved in this phase were introduced in the section on the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or in the subsection devoted to the planning phase of 
14
 Picture taken from the presentation by Professor Robert J. Bohls Sr. titled "Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting System," Defense Systems Management College, Ford Belvoir, Virginia, 1998. 
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the PPBS. The players who were not presented earlier and who have significant influence over 
the outcome of the programming phase of the PPBS will now be presented. 
(1) Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (OSD (D, PA&E))—The 
Director of PA&E is subordinate to the USD (Comptroller). His main task is to prepare the pro- 
gramming guidance portion of the DPG and to formulate the Fiscal Guidance to the Services. 
The Director of PA&E and his staff play the leading role for the OSD during the programming 
phase of the PPBS. They also help manage the Summer Program Review Process. The Director 
of PA&E develops the Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs). Additionally, the PA&E is re- 
sponsible for managing the F YDP. 
b)        National Level Programming Products 
The most important and final product of the programming phase of the PPBS is 
the PDM, which will be presented below. Another crucial output of the .programming phase, the 
Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), is also presented below. Products associated directly 
with the Program Review Phase (PRP) are presented in the subsection of this chapter devoted to 
thePRP. 
(1) Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA)—The product of the Joint 
Strategic Planning System (JSPS) during the planning phase of the PPBS is the Chairman's Pro- 
gram Recommendation (CPR). It utilizes information gathered during the ongoing Joint War- 
fighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process. Moreover, the CINCs participate actively in 
preparation of this document. It articulates the Chairman's personal and specific recommenda- 
tions directly to the SECDEF regarding priorities for the DPG. 
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The CPA is also the product of the JSPS. However, the CPA is not issued 
until after the Services' POMs are submitted or the Program Reviews (PRs) are conducted during 
the programming phase of the PPBS. The CPA provides the SECDEF with the advice, analysis, 
and recommendations from the CPR and documents the Chairman's personal assessment of the 
adequacy, balance, and conformance to the DPG of the Service POMs.15 The CPA is designed to 
help the SECDEF with the PDM. It also provides the CINCs with the means to submit alterna- 
tives to the Services' program recommendations during the OSD Program Review 
Phase/Summer Review. These recommendations suggest resource reallocation that might im- 
prove the allocation's conformance to the established priorities. This would support the CINCs 
requirements and overall warfighting capabilities within the POM funding levels. 
(2) Program Decision Memorandum (PDM)—PDMs are documents re- 
flecting the final decisions on the composition of forces (all Services and Agencies combined). 
The PDMs are issued by DEPSECDEF. The PDMs represent the approval of the Service POMs 
as modified by the Defense Resource Board. Each POM producer receives its PDM. Any deci- 
sion to change the Service or Agency POM is reflected in the PDMs. There might be various 
changes from various sources, including the Program Review Group or the Defense Resources 
Board's deliberations or the recommendations from the CPA. 
Usually there are two PDMs. The first Program Decision Memorandum 
(PDM I) is published in September. This happens before the Services submit their Budget Esti- 
mate Submissions (BESs) to the OSD. The PDM-I reflects changes that will result from easily 
resolved issues. The second PDM (PDM-II) is released in November. It solves the issues that 




OSD, it is usually incorporated into the FYDP as a Program Budget Decision (PBDs). There are 
no reclamas possible since PDMs are signed decisions. 
c)        Program Review Phase 
The primary contributors to the programming phase and resource allocation are 
the Services. They accomplish this by submitting their respective POMs. The major contribution 
of the JCS and the OSD occurs during the review and after the submission of the Services' 
POMs/PRs. The CJCS's contribution is known as the Chairman's Program Assessment. The 
OSD's staff contribution happens during the Summer/Program Review process. Both the CPA 
and the Summer/Program Review require a thorough deliberation over the Services' submitted 
POMs. This usually involves defending the Services' position against any proposed alterna- 
tives.16 
(1) Components of the Summer/Program Review Process—Presented in 
this subsection are the players involved in the process. Players presented earlier will not be in- 
cluded here. 
(2) Summer Program Review Issue Teams—The Issue Teams look at des- 
ignated issues during the Summer Program Review of the Service POMs/PRs. The Issue Teams 
are organized by the OSD (D, PA&E), and consist of representatives from the OSD offices, the 
Joint Staff, and the Services. Their task is to assess the issues, to prepare briefings, and to write 
Issue Papers, as required, during the Summer Review.17 
(3) OSD POM/PR Preparation Instructions (PPI)—After the leadership of 
each Service reviews its appropriate program proposals, the Services POM/PR are submitted to 






document called, "Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Preparation Instructions (PPI). This 
document provides the Services with formats for preparing and submitting the POMs/PRs to the 
OSD. 
(4) Summer Review & POM/PR Issue Papers—The OSD's process of re- 
view of the Service's POM/PR begins by issuing the Major Issues List. This list addresses cer- 
tain issues to be reviewed over the summer. The main purpose of these issues is to assess the 
compliance of the Services' POM/PR with the DPG. An OSD-led team of analysts taken from 
the Services, the Joint Staff and other DoD agencies involved in the particular issue conducts the 
assessment. Findings and recommendations from each team are presented to the group of senior 
resource managers and programmers from the OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services. This group 
is called the Program Review Group. 
The Summer/Program Review also generates an opportunity for the Ser- 
vices, the Joint Staff, the CINCs and other DoD agencies to present the POM issues which they 
consider deserving of further deliberation. It may happen that several hundred candidate-issue 
topics exist. They are divided into either major or minor issues. 
Major issues are those affecting broad policy matters, involving more than 
one Service. They are analyzed thoroughly by the Issue Teams and presented directly to the Pro- 
gram Review Group if it is decided that the PRG should consider them. Minor issues consider 
programmatic problems handled through POM/PR Issue Papers. The PRG, chaired by the Direc- 
tor, PA&E, analyzes and screens the Issue Papers to determine if they are appropriate for pre- 
senting to the Defense Resources Board. The PRG makes decisions on most of the Issue Papers; 
however, some of them are sent to the DRB for consideration and decision. From the Services' 
point of view, the Summer/Program Review process is nothing more than a defense of their 
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POMs against changes proposed by the PRG or the DRB. The Services usually defend their own 
positions by assessing and analyzing alternatives proposed in Issue Papers. Any errors or omis- 
sions of facts may provide counterarguments for the opponents, particularly for the PRG or the 
DRB. 
3.      Budgeting Phase 
In the budgeting phase, the DoD components shall develop detailed budget esti- 
mates for the budget years of programs approved during the programming phase. 
A joint Office of Management and Budget (OMB)/DoD budget review is con- 
ducted; the results are issued in Program Budget Decisions (PBDs). 
(DoD directive 7045.17) 
With the beginning of the Budgeting phase, both the fiscal and program level detail is 
converted into its corresponding Appropriation budget format in preparation for the review and 
approval of the Congress. The main purpose of this phase is to ensure that the Program Objective 
Memorandum modified by the Program Decision Memorandum is executable. 
The analysis takes into consideration the fact-of-life execution issues of the first two 
years of the six-year POM. When all necessary changes are made, the new executable DoD 
budget is submitted to the Congress for review and approval.18 The DoD budget submitted to the 
Congress is the best option, from the DoD officials' point of view, for providing the U.S. Mili- 
tary Forces with the best mix of forces (people, materials, resources, money) to meet the goals 
established by both the NSS and the NMS. Figure II-7 presents the timeline of the budgeting 






Question: Are We Executing Efficiently? 
Objective: Develop a Coherent, Consistent & Balanced 
Budget 
Responsibility: USD ( C) 
MidAug Sep 15       Oct/Nov 














Meet with SECDEF, 
•5-6 Major Issues 
with Offsets 





PEO / PM 
Advance    Signed by DEPSECDEF 
Questions     orTJSD(Comptroller) 
• Execution 'Communicates OSD's  I DRB 
Decisions to Services     '  
• Advance PBDs 
sometimes available, 
Reclama within 96 hours 





Update of FYDP Budget Estimate Submission 
Headquarters Action Officer 





Update of FYDP 
Figure II-7 The Timeline and Main Players of the Budgeting Phase19 
The difference between the programming and budgeting phase is the accuracy in estimat- 
ing the money needed to meet the NSS and NMS goals. To make the budget executable, more 
precise budget estimates are required. These estimates have to use the most accurate and current 
data available. 
a)       National Level Budgeting 
When the Services submit their Budget Estimate Submissions (BESs) (mid Sep- 
tember), they are reviewed by the OSD and the OMB. Simultaneously with the review, a draft of 
a Program Budget Decision (PBD) is prepared. These drafts are recommended adjustments to the 
Services' BESs. Before they are signed, they represent only recommendations and the Services 
Picture taken from the presentation by Professor Robert J. Bohls Sr. titled "Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting System," Defense Systems Management College, Ford Belvoir, Virginia, 1998. 
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can, through the reclama process (September-October), explain their views on the matters in- 
volved. After scrutinizing the responses to unsigned PBDs, the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) submits the final document to the DEPSECDEF for a decision and signature of a 
final PBD (October-November). The only chance for the Services and the CINCs to change any- 
thing proposed in the final PBD is through the outstanding budget issues (December). Some of 
these issues, called Major Budget Issues (MBI), are solved during the session between the Ser- 
vice Secretary and the SECDEF (mid December). The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff also at- 
tends this session, presenting the views and concerns of the JCS and the respective CINCs. After 
the MBIs are resolved, the Services revise their budgets to reflect decisions resulting from the 
budget review process. The DoD submits its portion of the President's Budget (PB) and updates 
the FYDP. This ends the PPBS cycle. 
b)        National Level Budgeting — Players 
(1) Office of Management and Budget (OMB)—The main purpose of the 
OMB is to assist the President in organizing and managing the Executive Branch. The OMB 
works directly for the President and develops the Fiscal Guidance that the OSD and the Services 
need to develop programs within fiscal constraints. The OMB participates with the OSD in the 
combined OSD/OMB Budget Review of the Services' BESs. The OMB is the leading govern- 
mental agency in the process of creating the President's Budget. 
(2) Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller (USD (C))—The USD (C) is 
the leading OSD individual in the budgeting phase of the PPBS. The USD (C) is responsible for 
both formulating and executing the budget. Analysts from this office along with OMB analysts, 
review and analyze the Services' BESs, issue PBDs and prepare the DoD portion of the Presi- 
dent's Budget for submission to Congress. 
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(3) Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
(USD (AT&L))—USD (AT&L) is the OSD individual present during the OSD Budget Review 
or reclama process whenever major acquisition programs are at issue. 
E.      DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BRANCHES 
Although the PPBS is common for the U.S. military forces, each branch has developed its 
own version of the system to help it develop its part of the defense budget. This section will pre- 
sent brief a summary of the differences between the U.S. military branches. For more detailed 
analysis of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) used by the Military Ser- 
vices one can read Joseph S. Snook's thesis "An Analysis of the Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting System (PPBS) Processes of the Military Services within the Department of De- 
fense." This part of the thesis is based mainly on the chapter from the above thesis comparing the 
people, processes and products involved in the PPBS system. The subsection is divided into fur- 
ther subsections examining the Military Services in the following order: the Army, the 
Navy/Marine Corps and the Air Force. 
1.      US Army 
a)        Planning Phase 
A two star flag officer leads the Army's PPBS process. His position is the Deputy 
Chief of Operations and Plans. His division (Operations and Plans Division) leads and controls 
the planning process. The Total Army Analysis (TAA) facilitates the process of determining the 
base force level required to meet the objectives set for the Army in The Army Plan (TAP). The 
Army Plan is a document reflecting the Senior Army Leadership's Vision. It includes several 
distinct areas such as strategic planning (ASPG); modernization (AMP); long range research, 
development and acquisition (LRRDAP); and planning guidance (APG). All these areas have 
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separate documents describing in detail the intent of the Army. These documents together create 
the Army Plan (TAP). The Army Planning Guidance Memorandum (APGM) is derived from the 
TAP. 
b) Programming Phase 
The Army Planning Guidance gives the top down guidance to Major Commands 
(MACOMs) to develop POM inputs [Ref 4]. It covers a 10-year period. These inputs are devel- 
oped in the form of Management Decision Packages (MDEPs). Their submission is prioritized. 
They contain both program and budget data. They account for the use of all the Army's re- 
sources. The Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE) is responsible for reviewing 
them. Several Program Evaluation Groups (PEGs) support the DPAE by assessing the MDEP in 
the functional areas for which the PEGs are responsible. Outputs from each of the PEG create the 
draft of the Army POM. 
c) POMReview 
Program Evaluation Groups are the first level of the Army POM review process. 
Their prioritized MDEPs are submitted to the Planning, Programming and Budget Committee 
(PPBC). The PPBC assesses the convergence of the MDEPs with the top-down guidance and 
decides what MDEPs will get the full resources required, part of the resources required or none 
at all. These suggestions or unsolved issues are presented to the Senior Review Group < SRG) for 
consideration. The SRG's suggestions in turn, are submitted to the Army Resource Board 
(ARB). Once the ARB makes a final decision on the issues presented, the DPAE puts them to- 
gether, formulating the package for submission to the OSD POM review process. [Ref. 4] 
d) BES Formulation 
The organization responsible for the budgeting process within the Army is the Of- 
fice of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA 
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(FM&C)). Because the MDEPs consist of both programming and budgeting data, once the PDM 
is received the MACOMs can tailor their inputs to meet the PDM. The MACOM BES inputs 
provide the data for the Army BES and are the starting point for internal review. [Ref. 4] 
e)        Internal BES Review 
The corporate structure of the Army is the body responsible for the review of the 
issues on the margin. To support this review, however, the chairman of the PPBC is changed to 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for the Budget (DAB). The review is not different 
from the one mentioned above. The only differences are the data used, which now are the budg- 
etary data instead of program data. The ARB makes final approval on the BES. [Ref. 4] 
2.      US Navy/Marine Corps 
a)        Planning Phase 
The Navy's leading organization in the planning phase of the PPBS is the Direc- 
tor Assessment Division (N81). Senior corporate structure groups such as the Navy's Integrated 
Resources and Requirements Review Board (IR3B) and the DoN Program Strategy Board 
(DPSB) help him in reviewing and approving the programming guidance. [Ref. 4] The Marine 
Corps is led by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy and Operations in the PPBS. 
The Navy uses the Integrated Warfare Architecture Review (IWAR) in the plan- 
ning process of developing the guidance for the programming phase. For inputs and guidance 
IWAR uses the CNO Strategic Planning Guidance (CSPG) and Long Range Planning Objectives 
(LRPO), both developed by the CNO's headquarters organizations. 
The Commandant of the Marine Corps is responsible for preparing the document 
that guides the programming process. The Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG) is used by 
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policy and Operations to develop the Marine Corps Master 
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Plan (MCMP). The combat development process generates the requirements for the Marine Air- 
Ground-Task Forces. The output of this process is the force level in the MCMP. This process is 
very centralized. 
The Navy's final product of the planning phase is the CNO Program Analysis 
Memorandum (CPAM). The CPAM contains the programming guidance. Other documents are 
developed to support bridging the Navy's vision statement to programming guidance. 
The task of bridging the vision statement to the programming guidance in the Ma- 
rine Corp is accomplished by Commandant of Marine Corps Planning Guidance (CPG). In addi- 
tion, the MCMP contains the elements of programming guidance. It finishes the planning phase 
and begins the programming phase. 
b)       Programming Phase 
The Navy has a very centralized process for POM development. The Resource 
Sponsors (RS) are the main bearers of the POM development process. They include different Di- 
visions and Directorates from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV).20 The Re- 
source Sponsors develop Sponsor Program Proposals (SPPs). The SPPs describe the resource 
allocation within these programs. The Resource Sponsor is also obliged to address the top five 
items from the CINC Integrated Priority List. SPPs establish the base for the POM review proc- 
ess within the Navy. [Ref. 4] 
The Total Obligational Authority (TOA) estimate developed by the Marine Corps 
Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) for Programs and Resources is used to develop the core funding 
level. This determines which programs will be taken into consideration during the allocation of 
resources. Program Evaluation Groups (PEGs) gather the information from the operational forces 
20
 More information about Resource Sponsors can be found on line: 
http://cno-n6.hq.navy.mil/N6E/PPBS/default.htm. 
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to determine the number and the scope of programs competing for the resources. PEG recom- 
mendations are prioritized and program initiatives are developed, providing the basis for the 
POM review process. PEGs are not fiscally constrained. 
c)        POMReview 
Contrary to the four-level Army POM review process, the Navy has only three 
levels. They include: the Integrated Resources and Requirements Review Board (IR3B), the 
CNO Executive Steering Committee (ESC) and the DoN Program Strategy Board (DPSB). 
The Resource Sponsors present their SPPs to the IR3B for review. Since the SPPs 
are consistent with planning guidance, they are compiled by the Programming Division from the 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N80) into a POM proposal. The ESC reviews the pro- 
posal for policy issues. Then, the CNO approves the Tentative POM (T-POM). The T-POM is 
presented by N80 and the Marine Corps DCS for Programs and Resources to the DPSB. After 
the review by the DPSB and decisions made by the SECNAV, the DoN POM is submitted to the 
OSD for review. [Ref. 4] 
d)        BES Formulation 
The Fiscal Division (N82) manages the Navy's budgeting process. The guidance 
for the BES comes from the Office of Budget (FMB). The Budget Submitting Officer < BSOs) 
provide the BES inputs and are responsible for submitting a balanced, executable BES. meeting 
the POM requirements and FMB guidance. The Navy's BES formulation process is decentral- 
ized. 
Within the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps DCS for Programs and Resources is 
responsible for the transition of the POM to the BES. Unlike the Navy, the Marine Corps' BES 
formulation process is strictly centralized. 
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e)        Internal BES Review 
Because the Marine Corps is a Budget Submitting Office (BSO) of the DoN, it 
also takes part in the Navy's internal BES review process. FMB conducts the Navy's BES re- 
view. The FMB analysts study the adherence of the BSOs to the POM and budget guidance. Ad- 
ditional sessions between FMB and the BSOs are conducted if the BSO assessment does not 
support the BES. If there is a lack of compromise, a Major Budget Issue meeting can be organ- 
ized between the SECNAV and the interested BSO to solve the problem. 
3.      US Air Force 
The U.S Air Force planning phase is led by a three-star flag officer, the Air Force 
Director of Plans (AF/XPX). The AF/XPX is responsible for developing the AF Strategic Plan 
(AFSP). This process is very centralized, concentrating all activities within the Director of Plans 
Division. 
a) Planning Phase 
The Air Force Strategic Plan is the document providing the necessary program- 
ming guidance for developing the POM. The Modernization Planning Process is developed to 
address the needs and requirements of the Air Forces for modernization. [Ref. 4] 
b) Programming Phase 
The programming guidance for the Major Commands (MACOM) within the Air 
Force is delivered via the Annual Planning and Programming Guidance (APPG). MACOM, In-, 
tegrated Process Teams (IPT) and Program Elements Monitors (PEMs) provide the inputs for the 
baseline extension. The Baseline Extension extends the Program Baseline into the last two years 
of a new FYDP. [Ref. 4] The other programs not chosen for extension compete for the remaining 
scarce resources (dollars). IPT proposals establish the inputs for the Air Force draft POM. 
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c)        POMReview 
The Air Force Corporate Structure (AFCS) is the body within the Air Force re- 
sponsible for producing and submitting the POM to the OSD. The AFCS consists of five mission 
and nine mission-support panels. They are required to forward balanced proposals for their areas 
of interest to the Air Force Group (AFG). The AFG compiles all proposals into one balanced in- 
tegrated AF program. The integrated program is then submitted to the Air Force Board (AFB). 
After conducting the review process, the AFB submits and makes recommendations to the Air 
Force Council (AFC). The AFC is the final review board. It makes final recommendations to the 
Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF). The Director of Programs Integration (AF/XPPE) submits 
the AF POM to the OSD for Review when approved. [Ref. 4] 
d) BES Formulation 
The Operational Budget Review (OBR) begins the process of BES formulation 
within the Department of the Air Force. The Investment Budget Review (IBR) is the next step in 
the BES formulation process. The Air Force Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget (SAF/FMB) 
is the leading individual responsible for conducting these two reviews. These reviews determine 
expected obligation and execution rates based on previous performance. The repriced POM is 
used as the starting point for the internal BES review process. This process is a SAF/FMB cen- 
tralized process. [Ref. 4] 
e) Internal BES Review 
The Air Force Corporate Structure (AFCS) reviews the BES. The chair of the 
AFB is delegated to the Deputy Secretary for Budget (SAF/FMB). The AFB is briefed on the 
changes and adjustments recommended by the OBR and IBR processes. The final approval is 
made by the SECAF after the AFC resolves all unsolved issues and submits the BES to the 
CSAF. 
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F.  CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CHAPTER 
The PPBS system is a complicated and multi-level system. In addition, each phase over- 
laps the two other phases. Because the PPBS is an overlapping system, the activities from the 
one phase must be completed on time. Otherwise, delays would be generated and the process 
would slow down. Because of the multi-level character, the PPBS system is exposed to such fac- 
tors as interest groups, lobbies, and political influence. Therefore, involvement by high level of- 
ficials and military officers is essential to provide the process with the best knowledge in their 
respective areas of interest. Another factor is that the system requires the involvement of so 
many personnel that a situation can easily be created in which some of the information is missed. 
However, the multi-level approach to the problem of scarce resource allocation provides 
the services with the most efficient use of the resources available. This is because each decision 
is analyzed, at least at the margin. There are many competitors for the resources, so each of them 
has to explain very clearly what they intend to do with the resources allocated. The process also 
provides a means for reclama for those who are dissatisfied with the outcome of the PPBS. How- 
ever, there is no appeal after the final decision. 
There are some differences in the process of formulating the products of each phase 
among the services. As mentioned earlier, some of them use a decentralized approach like the 
Army during the planning phase to gather the necessary information. Other Services take a 
highly centralized approach during the same phase. However, there are some changes during the 
next phase. The Army and Air Force use decentralized inputs and a centralized review and ap- 
proval process. The Navy and Marine Corps use a centralized approach during the whole proc- 
ess. 
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The next chapter describes the budgetary system used in Poland. The chapter is divided 
into three sections. The first section provides information on the legal base for the system. The 
second section analyzes the procedures used at various levels of the budget process such as the 
Ministry of National Defense level, the government level and the parliament level. The last sec- 
tion describes the means of control over the execution of the budget. This includes the means of 
control used by both the Ministry of National Defense and Government Agencies. 
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III.    POLISH BUDGETARY SYSTEM 
A.      INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the process of formulating the Polish defense budget. The introduc- 
tory part will present the governmental system in Poland. The intent of this part is to ensure that 
a reader will clearly picture the procedures occurring during the process of formulating the 
budget. The next section will present the legal basis of the budgetary process. This section will 
concentrate mainly on the Constitution of the Republic of Poland as the main document. In addi- 
tion, some aspects of budget law will be presented. 
The scope of the second section focuses on the procedures that happen while the budget 
is formulated. Five subsections comprise this section. The first subsection presents the creation 
of the budget in the Ministry of National Defense. The next subsection delineates the procedures 
within the government of Poland. The third subsection describes the' procedures in the Parlia- 
ment. The fourth subsection concentrates on the options available to the President of the Repub- 
lic of Poland. The last subsection describes the execution of the budget in the MoND. 
The last section of this chapter concentrates on the control over the execution of the 
budget. There are two subsections. The first one describes how the Polish Ministry of National 
Defense controls the execution of the budget. The next subsection describes the role of the gov- 
ernmental agencies in the process of controlling the budget execution. 
The Polish governmental system presents a hybrid of a parliamentary system. On the one 
hand, Poland has the President, who is popularly elected every five years. The President of Po- 
land is also the Supreme Commander of the Polish Armed Forces. The President can exercise his 
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authority granted by the Constitution by issuing the Official Acts; however, the Prime Minister 
must sign these Official Acts. 
The President also chairs a National Defense Committee as the commander-in-chief. The 
Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defense are the Deputy Chairmen. The Committee 
also includes the Presidents of both the Sejm (lower house of the Parliament) and the Senate (up-r 
per house of the Parliament), the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance and the 
Chief of the General Staff. [Ref. 2] 
The hybrid character of the governing system in Poland results from the fact that the 
President sharing his power with the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers. The President 
appoints the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is legally obliged to introduce members of the 
Council of Ministers to the President. Once the Prime Minister reaches an agreement with the 
political parties creating the leading coalition, the President formally appoints the Prime Minister 
and the whole Council of Ministers. The Sejm then approves the whole government. 
If the President cannot appoint the Prime Minister or the government cannot win ap- 
proval from the Sejm, the Sejm is then required to appoint the new Prime Minister and the Coun- 
cil of Ministers and the President must accept them. If the above options do not result in the gov- 
ernment being approved by the Sejm, the President has the right to appoint the next Prime Minis- 
ter and his Council of Ministers and to submit them for a vote of confidence in the Sejm. In case 
of failure, the President must call for elections to form a new Sejm. Once in office, the Prime 
Minister issues policy documents to direct the branches of the Polish government. [Ref. 12] 
The Council of Ministers is responsible for executive issues. It accomplishes this by en- 
suring that laws are obeyed. The Council of Ministers supports the implementation of the law by 
drafting the budget and then controlling the execution of the budget. The Council also exercises 
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"general control in the field of national defence." [Ref. 12] Members of the Council are collec- 
tively responsible to the Sejm for the activities of the Council and are individually responsible to 
that body for matters within their competence. The members of the Council may be changed by 
the President at the request of the Prime Minister or in the case of a vote of "no confidence" by 
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Figure III-l General Overview of the Budgeting Process in Poland21 
The following lists the major bodies and institutions affecting the process of creating the 
State Budget as a whole and the Defense Budget in particular: 
• The Ministry of Finance; 
• The Ministry of Economy; 
• The Monetary Policy Chamber; 
• The National Bank of Poland; 
• The Level I Budget Holders; 
• The Council of Ministers; 
• The Parliament; 
21NPS Report: "Proposed Blueprint for Polish National Acquisition Strategy," Naval Postgraduate School, Mon- 
terey CA 2000. 
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•    The President. [Ref. 13] 
The budget development starts within the executive branch. Next, it is transferred to the 
legislative branch for approval. Once approval has been granted, the process returns to the execu- 
tive branch for final approval and execution. Figure III-l provides an overview of the budget 
procedures across the institutions of the government. In short, the Ministry of National Defense 
submits a defense budget proposal by the Ministry of Finance to the Council of Ministers. The 
Council of Ministers can either approve or not approve the proposal. When the budget is not ap- 
proved, the necessary changes must be made. Once approved, the defense budget, which is part 
of the State Budget, is submitted to the Parliament for further consideration and possible changes 
and finally for approval. Once approved by the Parliament, the State Budget and the included 
defense budget is given to the President for final approval and execution. The above steps will be 
presented in the following sections, presenting the procedures at the different levels of creating 
the budget. 
B.  THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE BUDGET SYSTEM 
There is a close relationship between public spending and the law. The Polish legal sys- 
tem has no such term as "defense budget." According to the law, the State budget consists of 
parts. These parts are assigned to the chief bodies of the state authority. The Ministry of National 
Defense is responsible for the 29th part of the state budget. This part is called "The Ministry of 
National Defense." The following subsections will describe the laws and regulations actually be- 
ing used in Poland in creating of the Ministry of National Defense's part of the State Budget. The 
first subsection will cover the legal regulations covered by the Constitution of the Republic of 
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Poland. The second subsection will cover budget law and other regulations, for example those 
issued by the Minister of National Defense. 
1.      The Constitution 
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland states that the Sejm enacts the State Budget 
annually and can grant or can refuse to grant approval for the financial accounts submitted by the 
Council of Ministers for the execution of the budget in the previous year.22 The Constitution des- 
ignates the Council of Ministers as the body responsible for submitting the annual budget pro- 
posal and budget execution report for the previous. The Council of Ministers has to submit the 
proposed budget draft to the Parliament three months before the beginning of the new fiscal year. 
In addition, the Constitution defines the powers of the President in detail. For example, article 
225 says "If, after four months from the day of submission of a draft Budget to the Sejm, it has 
not been adopted or presented to the President of the Republic for signature, the President of the 
Republic may, within the following 14 days, order the shortening of the Sejm's term of office." 
[Ref. 12] 
2.      Budget Law 
Whereas the Constitution of the Republic of Poland provides very general. \et. legally 
binding norms and solutions in terms of the State budget and other issues associated w ith it. the 
Budget Law provides detailed information and requirements to the various budget holders Two 
legal acts regulate budget issues in Poland. The first act is the Budget Law. The second is called 
the Budgetary Statute.23 
a)        Budget Law 
The Budget Law regulates the terms, defines the general principles and the proce- 
dures of accumulating pecuniary resources covered by the state budget and communes budgets. 
22
 The Government of Poland, The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Art. 226, 1997. 
23
 The Government of Poland, The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Art. 219, 1997. 
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Local self-governments are assigned the money that allows them to fulfill their legal obligations. 
It also defines the allotment of the financial resources for financing the tasks resulting from the 
function of the state and the local self-governments. It also regulates organizational and legal 
forms of the entities, which implement tasks included in the state budget and the commune's 
budgets. In addition, the Budget Law determines the way the Budgetary Status—the State 
Budget—is planned and executed and outlines the responsibilities in case the Budgetary Status is 
violated. The Budget Law is the general legal regulation, as compared to the annual detailed 
regulation, which is the Budgetary Status. 
b) Budgetary Status 
Contrary to the Budget Law, the budgetary status is a detailed legal act, enacted 
annually. The budgetary status determines the financial resources delegated to the particular 
budget holders and specifies what these resources will be spent on. To address all of the different 
budget holders and the very complex set of issues that the defense budget deals with, budgetary 
classifications were created. 
c) Defense Budget Classifications 
The Ministry of National Defense has a separate part of the state budget. The 
number describing this part is "Twenty-Nine." Part 29 is further divided into thirteen sections. 
They include among others: 
• Health Care: covers expenditures from the defense budget for the military Health 
Care Service; 
• Social Service: issues associated with social help such as child benefits, nursing 
benefits, etc. 
• State and Local Administration: covers the payrolls of the civilian employees hav- 
ing the status of government employees and those working in the Central Institu- 
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tions24 of the Ministry of National Defense (i.e., the Departments, General Staff or 
Chancellery of Minister of National Defense); 
• Military Jurisdiction: includes the means for financing military courts and procura- 
tors; 
• Social Security: provides money for the pensions and other liabilities for retired mili- 
tary personnel; 
• Subsidies for Economic Tasks: provides subsidies for military firms maintaining 
military infrastructure; 
• National Defense: the primary and the largest portion of the defense budget. 
More detail is provided, according to the types and forms, for the division of ex- 
penditures and revenues by chapters and paragraphs. Expenditures and revenues are addressed 
separately. There are 12 chapters in the above National Defense part of the defense budget of the 
Republic of Poland. The following are only examples of the chapters: 
• Chapter 75201: Land Forces; 
• Chapter 75202: Air Force; 
• Chapter 75203: Navy; 
• Chapter 75205: Integration with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; 
• Chapter 75206: Military Intelligence. 
Other chapters cover in detail the areas of the liabilities to the NATO budget and 
other international commitments, military justice and different military ministries. 
One aspect of the division by chapters is very important. This division is not 
static; it is a living document, changing according to the particular situational or parliamentary 
needs. Outdated chapters are excluded and new ones are added. In addition to changes at the 
chapter level, there are some changes at the paragraph level. As an example, the new Paragraph 
70 for acquisition of military equipment may be used. Created in 1998, it reflects the need for the 
Polish Armed Forces to acquire new equipment, combat systems, and to replace the old Russian 
24
 Central Institutions of the Ministry of National Defense refers to the Departments, the Offices of Deputy Ministers 
and others having the status of the Level II Budget Holders. 
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equipment. The changes reflect the dynamics of the reality and the need for effective and effi- 
cient management of the Polish Armed Forces. The division into parts and chapters is the same 
for expenditures and revenues; however, there are differences between them at the paragraph 
level. [Ref. 13] 
d)        Paragraph Classification of the Defense Budget 
Paragraph classification in the defense budget is a derivative of the general classi- 
fication used for the state budget and provided by the Ministry of Finance. There are some ex- 
ceptions, however. In the paragraph classification of the defense budget, there are no paragraphs 
like "gambling tax" or "inflows from the revenue of the National Bank of Poland." This is be- 
cause the military does not conduct such activities. The differences mentioned earlier have some 
historic roots, when some parts of the budget were considered classified. The present classifica- 
tion meets the demand for the defense budget to be compatible with other parts of the state 
budget. This is particularly important at two times. The first situation is when the budget pro- 
posal or draft is being prepared for presentation and submission to the Sejm for consideration. 
The second need occurs when the government is required to submit a report on execution of the 
budget for the past year. 
In addition to the paragraph classifications, there is the next level of division by 
position. A position describes, in detail, the exact expenditure that appropriated mone> is to 
cover. Once again Paragraph 70 is used to describe the possible positions within a paragraph. 
This paragraph includes 32 positions. The following are examples of positions: 
• Position 01- missile systems; 
• Position 07- aircraft-different types; 
• Position 10- artillery; 
• Position 25- vessels and other supporting units. [Ref. 13] 
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e)        Budget Holders Classification 
Another type of classification is the internal division for budget holders within the 
Ministry of National Defense. This is the index of the military institutions and agencies respon- 
sible for planning and executing the expenditures assigned to them. For example, the Com- 
mander of the Land Forces is responsible for all issues associated with the existing land forces 
with the exception of units assigned to other commands. The number of budget holders is tightly 
associated with the organizational needs of the Ministry of National Defense. 
As of this writing there are 21 budget holders. They are organized by levels. The 
highest level is a Level I Budget Holder. The Minister of National Defense holds the first level. 
He is the main budget holder within the ministry. Level II Budget Holders are the commanders 
of the three services, i.e., the Land Forces (Army), the Air Forces and the Navy, Commanders of 
the Military Districts25 and commander of the Warsaw Garrison. They report directly to the Min- 
ister of National Defense. Level III Budget Holders are Directors of some Departments and other 
organizational units reporting directly to the Level II Military Budget Holders. Level III Budget 
Holders can transfer funds assigned to them to other units, which are under the Level III Budget 
Holders' jurisdiction. There is a small difference between Level III Military and Civilian Budget 
Holders. Level III Civilian Budget Holders cannot transfer funds to someone else. [Ref. 13] 
The classifications of the defense budget are complex and can be difficult to un- 
derstand for somebody without preparation and necessary knowledge. These classifications, 
however, make the control and planning of the budget easier and more transparent, which in the 
case of money is highly desirable. 
25
 There are four military districts in Poland: the Central Military District, the Pomeranian Military District, the Sile- 
sian Military District and the Cracowian Military District. The districts represent the division of the territory of Po- 
land into parts, command over which is granted to separate commanders. 
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f) Other Budget Regulations 
According to the legal delegation, the Minister of National Defense, in consulta- 
tion with the Minister of Finance, can establish detailed norms and regulations of financial man- 
agement for the subordinate units and departments within the Ministry of National Defense. In 
addition, the Minister of Defense can issue any classification of expenditures and revenues, any 
financial accounting norms and standard operating procedures resulting from hearings in front of 
the ministerial committees in case of budget violations. These norms and standard operating pro- 
cedures can be useful in creating the defense budget. However, there are some limitations im- 
posed on the Minister of National Defense. As mentioned earlier, the defense budget must be 
compatible with other parts of the state budget. [Ref. 13] 
The next section describes the budgetary, procedures used during the process of 
creating the defense budget of Poland. 
C.  THE BUDGETARY PROCEDURES 
Creating the budget occurs simultaneously at a minimum of three levels. These levels, 
however, cannot exist independently. The main level, at which the defense budget, as a part of 
the state budget, is created at the governmental level. The next level, equally important, is the 
level of MoND. That level is responsible for developing the particular shape of the defense 
budget within the Ministry of National Defense. The last level is the Parliamentary level, at 
which final changes and deliberations are made. Finally, the budget is submitted to the President 
for final approval and signature. The presidential signature makes the state budget executable. 
This section presents the three levels used in creating the defense budget in Poland. It begins 
with the level of the Ministry of National Defense. The next subsection outlines the governmen- 
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tal level. Finally, Section C presents procedures within the Parliament and options available for 
the President of Poland in the process of approving the state budget. [Ref. 13] 
The Constitution of Poland states that the Council of Ministers is responsible for submit- 
ting the next-year state budget draft to the Sejm. The Constitution also states that submission 
must be done at least three months before the beginning of the next fiscal year. The beginning of 
the New Year is assumed to be the beginning of the new fiscal year. [Ref. 12] 
The preparation of the state budget by the Level I Budget Holders, among whom is the 
Minister of National Defense, is regulated by the Minister of Finance who issues a special note 
to the main budget holders annually. This note is called the Budget Note. The Budget Note estab- 
lishes details for the process of creating the budget. All Level I Budget Holders are required to 
submit the material plans to be realized during the fiscal year. [Ref. 13] 
1.      Formulation of the Budget within the Polish Ministry of National Defense 
Figure III-2 presents the structure of the Polish Ministry of National Defense. Presenting 
the structure here helps one understand the process of creating the defense budget within the 
MoND. The following are the most important actors in this process: 
• The Minister of National Defense; 
• The Budget Department; 
• The General Staff; 
• Level II Budget Holders. 
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Figure III-2 General Structure of the Polish Ministry of National Defense26 
The Minister of National Defense is the Level I Budget Holder. The Next Level Budget 
Holders are the commanders of the three services, i.e., the Land Forces (Army), the Air Forces 
and the Navy, commanders of military districts and the Commander of the Warsaw Garrison. 
They report directly to the Minister of National Defense. The above actors create the MoND 
Budget Committee. The Chairman of the MoND Budget Committee is the Minister of National 
Defense. Three Permanent Subcommittees support the MoND Budget Committee in the matters 
assigned as their responsibilities. The following present the areas of interests of the Permanent 
Subcommittees: 
•   Permanent Subcommittee on R&D and implementation, armament, military equip- 
ment and spare parts procurement and maintenance—Chaired by the Director of the 
Armament Policy Department. 
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• Permanent Subcommittee on construction investment—Chaired by the Director of the 
Infrastructure Department. 
• Permanent Subcommittee on other expenditures—Chaired by the Deputy Director of 
the Budget Department. [Ref. 2] 
The basis for the planning process within the MoND in Poland is the Guidance of the 
Minister of National Defense for Defense Budget Planning. The MoND Budget Committee re- 
vises the draft of this guidance. This guidance covers the following areas: 
• Main undertakings for organizational changes, R&D, acquisition of the new equip- 
ment and systems, maintenance of equipment currently in use, investment in new fa- 
cilities and maintenance of the current facilities and training and retainment of per- 
sonnel; 
• Limits on expenditures for particular budget holders; 
• Number of positions for civilian and military personnel for particular budget holders; 
• Propositions for systemic changes. [Ref. 13] 
To prepare the budget drafts, the Guidance of the Minister of National Defense for the 
Defense Budget Planning provides the baseline for the Commanders of the Services and the 
Commanders of the Military Districts, who are the Level II Budget Holders and for the Directors 
of the Central Institutions of the MoND who are the Level III Budget Holders,. These budget 
holders have been assigned detailed types of expenditures for both planning and executing mat- 
ters. Detailed norms and rules for preparing the budget drafts are presented in the "Budget Note 
of the Director of the Budget Department." 
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Figure III-3 Activities within the MoND27 
Figure III-3 presents the overall process of preparing and creating the Defense Budget 
within the Ministry of National Defense. As one can see from the figure III-3, the activities 
within the MoND overlap with the parliamentary stage of working on the budget. This overlap 
occurs during the Parliamentary Hearings, when the Level II Budget Holders are asked many 
questions regarding different aspects of the Defense Budget and activities conducted by particu- 
lar Budget Holders. 
The process of budget planning within the MoND begins in March. At that time, the 
Budget Department prepares the estimates for the funding requirements for the following year. 
The Level II Budget Holders and the General Staff help the Budget Department prepare these 
estimates. Several documents are included in the process of making these estimates. For exam- 
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pie, the Ministry of Economy in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Work and Social Policy and the National Bank of Poland, prepares macroeconomic forecasts. 
Assumptions about the State Budget approved by the Council of Ministers in matters concerning 
expenditures and revenues for particular parts of the State Budget are included. Expenditures for 
a particular part of the State Budget are determined by limits assigned to these parts of the State 
Budget. Finally, other regulations concerning the number of personnel allowed for particular 
Budget Holders and wage rates are taken into consideration. [Ref. 13] 
In March, the Commander of the General Staff conducts the decision game. During that 
game, the Commanders of the Services, together with other executive staff from the Central In- 
stitutions of the Ministry of National Defense, present priorities and tasks for the particular 
Budget Holders (the Services, the Military Districts, the Central Institutions). Priorities and deci- 
sions made during this game are placed into the document that starts the main stage of the plan- 
ning process. This document is called the Guidance of the Minister of National Defense for the 
Defense Budget Planning. 
In April, the Budget Department, based on the information gathered from Level II Budget 
Holders, submits estimates on the predicted expenditures during the following year in the form 
of the Material Plan to the Ministry of Finance. The Guidance of the Minister of National De- 
fense for the Defense Budget Planning is issued in the same month. The Guidance establishes the 
military goals and priorities for the following year. However, these goals and priorities are not 
connected with the estimates submitted to the Ministry of Finance. [Ref. 2] 
In June, Level II Budget Holders submit their budget proposals to the Budget Depart- 
ment. The more detailed description ofthat process follows in the section describing preparation 
of the budget within the Land Forces. 
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In July, the Ministry of Finance provides the Ministry of National Defense with the limit 
for the defense budget. Usually this limit differs from the budget requested by the Ministry of 
National Defense. Additionally, the budget provided is not divided into functional or military 
services areas. To respond to the budget provided by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Na- 
tional Defense has only 21 days. [Ref. 2] The leading body in reallocating the assigned resources 
is the MoND Budget Committee. This body also allocates funds among the Services. The Budget 
Department makes the further allocation among the Level II Budget Holders. The corrected De- 
fense Budget is submitted to the Ministry of Finance in August. During September, the Council 
of Ministers conducts the necessary activities required to combine all parts of the State Budget 
into one budget. When this is accomplished, the State Budget is submitted to the Parliament. Oc- 
tober is the month of the Parliamentary Hearings. [Ref 14] Additionally, the Level II Budget 
Holders prepare their financial plans. 
By the end of October, the Parliament is expected to finish the process of hearings and to 
approve and to submit the State Budget to the President for the final approval. Once approved by 
the Parliament and signed by the President, the State Budget allows the Minister of National De- 
fense to develop the document called the Budget Decision. The Minister of National Defense has 
21 days to sign this document once the Parliament has passed and the President has signed the 
State Budget. The Budget Decision in turn approves the Level II Budget Holders and allows 
them to implement their respective financial plans. The financial plans approved by the Minister 
of National Defense are used as the basis for public tenders. Contracts, however, cannot be 
signed until January 1, which is the beginning of the new fiscal year. [Ref. 2] 
The following presents the process of preparing and creating part of the Defense Budget 
by the Level II Budget Holder—the Commander of Land Forces. 
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a)       Development of the Budget within the Land Forces 
Based on the Guidance of the Minister of National Defense for the Defense 
Budget Planning, the Commander of the Land Forces assigns tasks for the Chiefs of Departments 
of the Command of the Land Forces. They are responsible for preparing the budget of the Land 
Forces. These tasks include identifying the funds for particular activities and endeavors. Particu- 
lar attention is paid toward realizing allied commitments. 
After receiving the tasks, the Chiefs of the Departments, together with supporting 
staffs, prepare the draft of plans in the areas of their respective responsibilities: 
• Ensuring continuous day-to-day functioning of the units of the Land Forces and day- 
to-day training process, including personnel expenditures; 
• Financing the tasks resulting from integrating with NATO; 
• Providing the funds for acquiring new combat systems and equipment for moderniz- 
ing the Land Forces; 
• Ensuring enough funds for spare parts for equipment currently in use; 
• Providing necessary funds for overhauling the weapons and supplies of war and other 
equipment; 
• Financing R&D projects; 
• Financing international relationships; 
• Financing other tasks assigned to the Land Forces to perform tasks for other Sen ices. 
[Ref. 14] 
In creating the above plans, the Chiefs consider expected organizational changes 
of the Land Forces determined by personnel limits, legally binding norms of expenditures, the 
quantities of armament and equipment planned for purchase and costs and expenditures from 
previous years. In case of overdrafts, corrections are made by the Commander of the Land 
Forces who cannot exceed the limits imposed on him by the Minister of National Defense. These 
limits are included in the Guidance of the Minister of National Defense for the Defense Budget 
Planning. 
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The Chief Accountant of the Land Forces is responsible for preparing the draft of 
the budget of the Land Forces. The Chief leads the whole process of preparing the draft of the 
budget within the Land Forces. In this process he is obliged to follow the rules established by the 
Director of the Budget Department and published in the Budget Note. [Ref. 14] 
Once prepared and approved by the Commander of the Land Forces, the budget 
draft of the Land Forces is submitted, in June, to the Secretary of State-First Deputy Minister of 
the National Defense, the General Staff and to the Budget Department for verification by the 
Permanent Committees existing within the MoND. Any proposals of changes and comments are 
returned to the units preparing the particular parts that the comments or proposals concern. 
In July, after determining the inflation rate and assessing the tentative limit for the 
defense budget by the Council of Ministers, the draft budget is transformed into the real prices 
and expenditures for the planned year. Additionally, the verification of the draft budget reflects 
the changes made by the Minister of National Defense according to the limits of expenditures for 
each Level II Budget Holder. These changes frequently require an extensive redesign of the 
budget of the Land Forces and other budgets of the Level II Budget Holders. [Ref. 14] The ex- 
tensive consultation on the final form of the budget between the Land Forces and the General 
Staff together with the Budget Department lasts until September. They include detailed discus- 
sions on topics such as preparing explanations for the Parliamentary National Defense Commit- 
tees. Topics of particular interest to the members of these committees include outlays for procur- 
ing new armament and military equipment, research and development projects, executing and 
accomplishing the goals of the Land Forces, and accounting for personnel positions. 
In October, the Commander of the Land Forces, with other Level II Budget Hold- 
ers, participates in the session of the Parliamentary National Defense Committee, explaining any 
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issues that may arise in his area of responsibility. The document resulting from these hearings is 
combined with other parts of the State Budget to generate the Project of the State Budget. [Ref. 
14] 
This Project, in the part responsible for the Land Forces, establishes the legal ba- 
sis for the Commander of the Land Forces to issue the project of the Financial Plan for the fol- 
lowing year. The Commander of the Land Forces sends the subordinate Level III Budget Holders 
information about planned budget expenditures for the following year based on the Financial 
Plan. Additionally, the information about personnel limits is included. The final decision is is- 
sued after the President of the Republic of Poland approves and signs the State Budget. The issu- 
ing of the Budget Decision by the Minister of National Defense ends the budgeting process. 
[Ref. 14] 
The next subsection presents a description of activities that occur within the 
government during the process of creating the defense budget. 
2.      Procedures in the Government 
The Minister of Finance, as a part of the government, establishes the overall rules for all 
Level I Budget Holders. These rules are published in a document called the Budget Note of the 
Ministry of Finance. Although the role of the Minister of Finance is significant when creating the 
State Budget, the Council of Ministers, led by the Prime Minister, makes the final decision on 
the budget. This subsection presents the activities that occur during the governmental stage of 
developing the State Budget. 
The Defense Budget, finally adjusted to reflect the limits on expenditures imposed on the 
Ministry of National Defense by the Ministry of Finance, is submitted by the Minister of Na- 
tional Defense to the Council of Ministers from August to September. 
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Figure III-4 presents the activities within the Council of Ministers. An interesting charac- 
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Figure III-4 Activities within the Council of Ministers28 
There are several factors that the Prime Minister must consider when making decisions 
on the Defense Budget. The most important factors are other governmental priorities and the im- 
pact of the Defense Budget on the economy. 
The Committee for Defense Affairs revises the Defense Budget and the appropriate level 
of funding for the MoND. This Committee exists within the Council of Ministers The Minister 
of National Defense leads the Committee. The Committee for Defense Affairs includes the fol- 
lowing ministers: 
• The Minister of Foreign Affairs; 
• The Minister of Economics; 
• The Minister of Finance; 
• The Minister of Communication; 
• The Minister of Education. [Ref. 2] 
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During its work on defense matters, the Committee for Defense Affairs considers various 
information. Some of the information may be classified. The other types of information include 
budget materials and the documents prepared by the MoND pertaining to national security and 
national defense strategy. The main interest is directed, however, toward the major acquisitions 
proposed by the MoND. [Ref. 2] 
The Ministry of Finance is one of the most important players in clarifying the final ver- 
sion of the State Budget. This office works together with other ministers and the Prime Minister 
and tries to balance defense matters with other different policy objectives of the government. 
[Ref. 2] 
Once an agreement within the Council of Ministers is reached and a final decision is 
made, the Council of Ministers submits the State Budget to the Parliament for further considera- 
tion. The Parliament has about three months (October-December) to pass the Budgetary Status 
into the law. [Ref. 12] 
3.      Procedures in the Parliament 
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland legally obligates the elected members of the 
two chambers of the Polish Parliament to review the budgets for all activities of the different 
ministries within the Polish government. [Ref. 12] First, the Sejm reviews the State Budget and 
the Defense Budget as a part of the State Budget. Two important committees within the Sejm 
that shape the final outlook of the State Budget are the Public Finance Committee and the Na- 
tional Defense Committee. The corresponding committees in the Senate are the National Econ- 
omy Committee and the National Defense Committee. 
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Figure III-5 presents the chain of events that occurs in the Parliament. 
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Figure III-5 Activities within the Parliament29 
The Defense Budget, as a part of the State Budget, is sent to the Parliament after being 
approved by the Council of Ministers. Once the State Budget is sent to the Parliament, the Public 
Finance Committee then reviews the State Budget. This review concentrates on the total spend- 
ing of each Level I Budget Holder and the total amount of money within the State Budget. Gov- 
ernmental priorities and the level of funding provided to them are also examined during that 
time. To support the Defense Budget, which is Section 29 of the State Budget, the MoND sends 
detailed budget data to the National Defense Committees of the Sejm and the Senate. The data 
are expected to support the request for the MoND spending. [Ref. 2] 
The Sejm's National Defense Committee reviews the defense budget separately. During 
this review, the officials from the MoND are consulted to explain and to corroborate the needed 
funds to the members of the committee. This usually takes the form of hearings, during which 
the officials from the MoND present their points of view to the members of the Committee, sup- 
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porting those views with numbers and specific arguments. Any question from the members of 
the committee must be answered clearly. The Committee then presents its views on the defense 
budget in the form of suggested changes to the Public Finance Committee. This usually happens 
during a plenary session. Members of the Public Finance Committee can also suggest changes to 
the defense budget. [Ref.2] 
After reaching a consensus on the final version of the State Budget, the budget is sent to 
the Senate for consideration. The Senate review takes the same form as the hearings in the Sejm. 
The committee specializing in defense matters, the Senate's National Defense Committee, re- 
vises the defense budget. The Committee that has authority over the entire State Budget, the 
Senate's National Economy Committee, can also make revisions. Just as in the Sejm, MoND of- 
ficials provide testimony to the members of the Senate's National Defense Committee. [Ref. 2] 
Members of both chambers of the Parliament vote for the defense budget when voting on 
the State Budget. If the budget bill approved by the Sejm is also approved by the Senate, it goes 
directly to the President for final approval and signature. If the Senate does not take any action 
within 30 days after the Sejm has forwarded it, the bill goes directly to the President too. Another 
option available to the Senate is to amend or to reject the budget proposed by the Sejm. In this 
situation, the Sejm can override the Senate action and the bill is sent to the President for ap- 
proval. In case of a lack of vote to override, the Sejm must conduct the whole process of budget 
considerations, addressing the action taken by the Senate, and pass the revised version of the bill 
at issue. 
4.      Signing of the Defense Budget by the President 
The President chairs the National Defense Committee. The Presidential advisory body, 
the National Security Bureau (BBN), provides the Minister of National Defense with critical ad- 
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vice, as the defense budget is prepared. In addition, the BBN helps the defense committees in the 
Parliament when they consider the defense budget. The final version might differ from the pref- 
erences articulated by the President in the early stages of the State Budget. Trade-offs in the 
process of approving the budget are nothing new. In this situation, the President has several 
available options. Figure III-6 presents the options available to the President. 
PARLIAMENT PRESIDENT 
Sign the bill 
© Refer the bill to Constitutional 
Tribunal 
<D 
*If 3/5 majority approve, optionfl) is mandated. 
If 3/5raajorily does not approve, the President may 
call for elections. 
Return the bill 
to the Sejm for 
Reconsideration* 
Figure III-6 Options Available to the President when Approving the State Budget30 
In the process of approving the State Budget, the President has three options: 
1. The President may approve the budget; 
2. The President may refer the bill to the Constitutional Tribunal; 
3. The President may send the bill back to the Sejm for reconsideration. [Ref. 12] 
If the President chooses the first option, funds are immediately available to the MoND. In 
case of the second option, two subsequent alternatives exist. The President must sign the bill if 
the Constitutional Tribunal rules that no law in the State Budget is violated. Otherwise, the prob- 
lems within the State Budget must be resolved. The President's third option involves sending the 
budget bill back to the Parliament for further consideration. In this situation, the Sejm can over- 
ride the presidential objection by a majority of 3/5 of all members of the Sejm. If that happens, 
30 
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the President must sign the budget bill. Otherwise, there axe two more options available. The first 
is that the political stalemate resulting from lack of an override must be resolved by the Sejm 
agreeing with the option proposed by the President. The second option, more dangerous, is that 
the President can shorten the term of the Parliament. [Ref. 12] 
5.      Execution of the Budget 
The execution of the budget is perceived as gathering and spending money provided by 
the budget and execution of the material plans that were submitted as the budget was prepared.   " 
During the execution of the budget, several regulations, included in the budget law must be con- 
sidered. According to the budget law, the complete execution of the budget happens during the 
period established by the regulations and the material plans. Budget Holders cannot exceed the 
limits imposed on them. In the process of executing the budget, the government is assigned a 
special role. The government holds the overall control over the execution of the budget. The fol- 
lowing are the main players in the execution of the defense budget: 
• The Council of Ministers; 
• The Minister of Finance; 
• The Minister of National Defense. 
The Minister of Finance is the executor of the budget from the operational point of view. 
His duties and obligations are multiple. The Minister of Finance controls the execution of reve- 
nues and expenditures of the state and tries to keep the budget balanced. The balance is estab- 
lished annually by the Budgetary Status (the State Budget). [Ref. 13] 
The Minister of National Defense controls the execution of the defense budget by organ- 
izational units that are subordinate to him. He is the Level I Budget Holder of the state budget in 
part number twenty-nine of the State Budget, dedicated to the national defense. [Ref. 13] 
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Within the Ministry of National Defense, there are also Level III Budget Holders who re- 
port directly to the Minister of National Defense. They make centralized expenditures. [Ref. 13] 
Subordinating all budget holders to the Minister of National Defense allows democratic 
control over the military forces. However, budgetary decisions are often made in a two-fold 
manner. The Minister of National Defense, who is the Level I Budget Holder, makes major deci- 
sions considering the defense funds. The Chief of the General Staff also makes those kinds of 
decisions; however, he is not the budget holder. [Ref. 13] 
Execution of the defense budget begins with establishing and submitting to the Minister 
of Finance the execution arrangement of the defense budget within the limits established by the 
State Budget. This must occur within 14 days after the State Budget became law. [Ref. 13] 
The Minister of National Defense divides the total amount of the defense budget among 
the Services, the Military Districts and the subordinate Level III Budget Holders. Three periods 
of 14 days exist during which the execution of the defense budget reaches the lowest level— 
military units. This is because each budget holder has 14 days to prepare its respective execution 
plan of its assigned portion of the defense budget. [Ref. 13] 
Several instruments help in executing the defense budget. These instruments include the 
following: 
• Executing Arrangement of the Defense Budget; 
• Limits and Directive Tasks; 
• Postponements of the Planned Expenditures during The Fiscal Year; 
• Institution of "Reducing" the Expenditures; 
• Denying Access to the Funds while Executing Them; 
• Annual Schedule of Allocation of Funds; 
• Completion of Financing of the Budgetary Tasks from the Special Funds. [Ref. 13] 
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The next section explains how the budget is executed and controlled. This section in- 
cludes the control conducted by the Ministry of National Defense itself, as well as by the special 
governmental agencies and institutions. 
D.  CONTROL OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BUDGET 
Control over spending is important, especially in the situations where the size of the 
budget cannot cover all requirements. Many different control systems in the field of spending 
public money exist; however, none provides ideal results. 
The goal for controlling the execution of the budget is to reveal any violations of budget- 
ary discipline and to prevent these violations from occurring in the future. By the term "budget- 
ary discipline," one should understand the rules described below affecting matters involving ac- 
quiring and spending budgetary funds. 
This section is divided in two subsections. These subsections cover the control by gov- 
ernmental agencies over the execution of the defense budget and the control by the Ministry of 
National Defense respectively. 
1.      Control by Governmental Agencies 
As specified in law, Parliament is the main body in Poland to control the execution of the 
budget. In particular, the lower chamber, the Sejm, has extensive experience in controlling the 
budget. The Sejm influences the budget in all its stages. The control of the Parliament over the 
State Budget has multiple stages: 
• Stage one: control over the State Budget that will be passed; 
• Stage two: control over the State Budget that has been passed; 
• Stage three: control over the State Budget that has been or is currently being executed 
and the interest in the way it was/is done. [Ref. 13] 
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Another form of control over the budget is making it available for public review. How- 
ever, the control over the budget cannot limit itself to making it public. The Supreme Chamber of 
Control   (NIK) of the Republic of Poland is the institution that has to provide governmental 
control over the whole State Budget. The NIK is subordinate to the Sejm. [Ref. 12] This gov- 
ernmental agency controls, in particular, "the carrying out of the State Budget and execution of 
other bills and laws in the field of financial, economic and organizational-administrative per- 
formance."32 
NIK submits to the Sejm among others the "Analysis of Executing of the State Budget 
and Assumptions about the Monetary Policy." That the NIK pays particular attention to the Na- 
tional Defense in matters involving the defense budget is highly important. This is reflected in 
the structure of the NIK, which includes the Department of National Defense Funds among oth- 
ers. [Ref. 13] 
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland requires the Council of Ministers, within five 
months after the end of the fiscal year, to submit to the Sejm an annual report on implementing 
the Budget, together with information on the State debt. [Ref. 12] This is another form of budg- 
etary control, which makes the Council of Ministers particularly interested in the lawful execu- 
tion of the budget. The Constitution also says: 
Within 90 days following receipt of the report, the Sejm shall consider the report 
presented to it, and, after seeking the opinion of the Supreme Chamber of Control, 
shall pass a resolution on whether to grant or refuse to grant approval of the fi- 
nancial accounts submitted by the Council of Ministers. [Ref. 12] 
In the case of refusing to grant the approval of the financing accounts, the Council of 




 Government of Poland, Act of 23 December 1994 on The Supreme Chamber of Control, translation made by the 
author. 
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2.      Control within the Polish Armed Forces 
The Minister of National Defense is responsible for control over the defense budget. 
Three bodies within the MoND help the Minister with this task. The following are the control 
institutions within the MoND: 
• The MoND Budget Committee; 
• The Budget Department; and 
• The Control Department. [Ref. 13] 
The MoND Budget Committee can request any information concerning budget matters 
from any person directly or indirectly involved in and responsible for preparing and executing 
the defense budget. This Committee assesses the execution of the central programs imposed by 
the Central Institutions of the MoND. It sets priorities and shifts funds to their most efficient use. 
The commanders of the lower levels are required to create similar committees to provide both 
continuous control over the execution of the budget and over the flow of information about this 
control through the chain of command. [Ref. 13] 
Another form of control over the budget is the "Law of Public Procurement." However, 
this form of control will not be discussed because it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The Director of the Budget Department provides additional control over the defense 
budget. Particularly important in this process of control is the role assigned to the Chief Ac- 
countant of the Armed Forces (Deputy Director of the Budget Department). His signature on the 
documents means that the current activities of the budget can be continued. A refusal to sign 
these documents means approval for continuing with the execution of the budget is withheld. 
Any mistakes, violations of the budget law and procedures must be corrected. Improvement must 
be exhibited or the next failure causes disciplinary repercussions. 
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As one can see, the Polish budgetary system is rather complicated, with some areas that 
seem to be unclear. One of these areas is the lack of clear accountability for the goals and priori- 
ties established in the Ministerial Guidance in terms of detailed amounts of funds necessary to 
meet goals. 
Another interesting aspect is the fact that Level III Budget Holders are excluded from 
creating and preparing the defense budget. Their role is to transfer assigned funds to the lower 
executors of the defense budget. Among the Level III Budget Holders are some who report di- 
rectly to the Minister of National Defense. They do not fit into the framework of division be- 
cause the tasks they perform are not of the same nature as the tasks of the Level II Budget Hold- 
ers. 
The next chapter analyses possible problems and prospects if the government of Poland 
decided to implement a modified version of the PPBS. 
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IV.    PROBLEMS WITH AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGING 
THE PROCESS IN POLAND 
A.      INTRODUCTION 
The replacement of one system for another rarely works effectively. This chapter presents 
both the problems and the prospects associated with the possible implementation of a PPBS-like 
system by the Polish Ministry of National Defense. The term a PPBS-like system is used here 
because there is little possibility of adapting a system that works in one place under one set of 
conditions to another place, in which conditions very often are quite different. For that reason, 
adopting the US PPBS without change is unrealistic. 
Future war scenarios will differ substantially from past wars. Military forces of the future 
will have to be significantly more strategically mobile. [Ref. 16] Other features of the future 
military forces will include increased tactical survivability and operational agility. Finally, 
greater emphasis will be placed on more technically advanced equipment that will be connected 
to a network of various defense systems. This technology will allow future armed forces to con- 
duct assaults on any targets from distant ranges. Such technological requirements or standards 
must be met. However, financing such an enormous effort will be monumental. Owing to scarce 
resources, many nations, including Poland, will face difficulties trying to attain such technology. 
After Poland regained its independence, the Polish armed forces inherited a significant amount of 
Russian equipment. This equipment is not compatible with Western standards of armament and 
the force structure that Poland hopes to attain. 
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To meet these standards, a system is required that would manage available resources. The 
American PPBS is such a system. According to many US experts, this system is perceived as su- 
perior to other systems used by American governmental agencies in managing their resources. 
However, in the present environment in Poland this system has to be modified to meet current 
requirements. [Ref. 16] 
This chapter is organized as follows: The first section presents possible problems that the 
government of Poland may face when implementing the PPBS-like system. The first subsection 
presets problems associated with the legal base of both systems. The second subsection addresses 
problems connected with the scope of national interest. The last subsection presents the differ- 
ences of the military structures that can cause possible problems that may emerge during the im- 
plementation of such a system. 
The second section of this chapter presents possible prospects resulting from implement- 
ing a PPBS-like system. The section covers military advantages and economic advantages that 
might result from implementing a system similar to the American PPBS. 
B.      PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF A PPBS-LIKE 
SYSTEM 
The first problem is the significant differences in the legal basis of both the PPBS and the 
Polish budgetary system. The second area is connected to the different scope of the national in- 
terest between the US and Poland. The last problem is the different structure of the armed forces 
of Poland and the United States. 
1.      Legal Problems 
Legal differences that exist between the US and Polish systems might affect the imple- 
mentation of a PPBS-like system in Poland. The United States and Poland have quite different 
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political systems. The President of the United States is required to submit the budget draft to the 
Congress for further considerations. To accomplish this legal requirement, the whole PPBS is 
used. In Poland, the President legally approves the state budget. Approval occurs only if the state 
budget reflects the presidential point of view. If the state budget does not reflect his view, it can 
be sent to the Parliament for further consideration or to the Constitutional Tribunal for adjudica- 
tion of the conformity of the state budget to the Constitution. This means that the President of 
Poland has a broader set of options for dealing with the state budget. By contrast, the President 
of the United States submits his final version of the state budget to the Congress, which then 
modifies it. As the head of state, the President of the US supervises the process of creating the 
draft of the state budget. The President of Poland does not have the supervisory role throughout 
the preparation of the State Budget draft, although he also approves the state budget, as does the 
President of the United States. 
Another legal difference between the two budgetary systems is that the Polish budgetary 
system is conducted on an annual basis whereas the PPBS is a biennial process with the output, 
the defense budget, submitted to the President every year. There is no law in Poland that would 
allow the Minister of National Defense to conduct the budgetary process on a biennial basis. The 
Constitution of Poland is clear in this matter. It requires the government of Poland to submit the 
budget draft to the Parliament for considerations on an annual basis. Although the Minister of 
National Defense has the right to issue regulations regarding the budgeting process of his 
agency, the final product must be compatible with the budget law, which does not provide for a 
biennial basis for making the budget. 
The next important difference between the US and Poland concerns the classification of 
budgetary expenditures. The Polish defense budget is divided into thirteen sections. These sec- 
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tions are organized to reflect the objectives or tasks of the budget. The budget presents expendi- 
tures according to the intent of the Minister of National Defense. This division does not name 
any specific person responsible for a particular section of the defense budget. Additionally, there 
are chapters within these thirteen sections. For example, the National Defense section is divided 
into twelve chapters. These chapters address particular budget holders who are responsible for 
expenditures. 
In the US, the division of the defense budget into Major Force Programs addresses the in- 
ternational security conditions that the United States faces. These programs, with further divi- 
sions into Program Elements, present the means for executing the National Security Strategy and 
the National Military Strategy. In Poland, no visible linkage exists between the division into sec- 
tions or even chapters and the national strategy. 
2.      Problems Associated with the Scope of the National Interest 
Among the many differences that occur between Poland and the United States, the scope 
of the national interest is one of the most significant. The US national interest is reflected by the 
way the PPBS is conducted, by the way the military forces are structured, and by the scope of 
tasks they are able to perform. The first impact can be seen in the construction of the FYDP. The 
Major Force Programs reflect the structure of the military forces that must help protect the na- 
tional interest of the United States. To articulate the US presence in many areas of the globe, the 
Unified Commands were created. Although these commands do not prepare the POMs (with one 
exception) or the PDMs, they are crucial for the whole PPBS process. The Unified Commanders 
are perceived as the representatives and military supporters of the US interest. By their presence 
in a region, a particular CINC is able to determine a regional situation, the means required for 
stabilizing or improving the situation or even intervention. 
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One of the most valuable inputs to the American PPBS is the Joint Strategic Planning 
System (JSPS). The whole JSPS is conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff supervises the process and then furnishes the President with the results of 
this process. The JSPS is conducted to provide the Chairman with the necessary information 
concerning the US military forces around the world. This assessment controls the ability of the 
US forces to conduct different types of military operations required by the different conditions in 
which they operate. Such a process does not exist in the Polish Ministry of National Defense. 
In Poland, the presence of Polish military forces in other countries reveals its approach 
toward Poland's allied commitments and international obligations. However, no process exists 
that would assess the ability of these forces to conduct different types of operations. 
3.      Structural Differences of the Armed Forces as the Source of Problems 
The structure of the military forces represents another factor that might have negative 
implications for implementing a PPBS-like system in Poland. The FYDP, which is the core ele- 
ment of the PPBS, reflects a general division of the US armed forces into different types depend- 
ing on the mission and engagement required. The FYDP does not divide the forces into branches 
but it divides them according to the purpose they are going to serve. This approach aggregates 
the overall forces from different services. 
In Poland, there are some attempts to do something similar to this type of division; how- 
ever, this attempt covers only units included in the rapid reaction forces. The rest of the forces 
are divided according to the branch division. The budget preparation for the rapid reaction forces 
is conducted in the same manner as for the rest of the military units. Another important issue 
arises from the fact that Poland does not have certain types of military forces. For example, Po- 
land does not have a counterpart to the American forces included in the Strategic Forces Pro- 
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gram, whose missions encompass intercontinental or transoceanic inter-theater responsibilities. 
Additionally, operational management, headquarters, logistics and support organizations associ- 
ated with these strategic forces are included in this category. The appropriate structure of the 
FYDP should be developed to reflect actual needs and requirements resulting from both the 
structure of the Polish military forces and the geopolitical location of Poland. The Strategic 
Forces Program is not the only example of different military structures. Another example is the 
sealift forces included in the Mobility Forces Program. To date, Poland has no need for carriers. 
The American CINCs can be treated as an equivalent to the Polish Military District 
Commanders. Since the Military District Commanders are also the Level II Budget Holders, they 
must prepare their budgets. Although these two groups have some similarities in their tasks and 
responsibilities (while the CINCs' tasks are broader in scope), the budgetary responsibilities of 
these two groups are vastly different. While the Unified Commanders prepare and submit Inte- 
grated Priority Lists (IPLs) that articulate their operational requirements, shortfalls, and specific 
concerns, the Military District Commanders are legally required to prepare and to submit the 
budget draft for their subordinate units' activities and undertakings. 
These are not the only examples of potential difficulties while implementing a PPBS-like 
system. The whole structure of the Polish military forces is established to meet requirements of 
the current budgetary system. For many departments the implementation of a PPBS-like system 
would be a major change. Right now, almost all players involved in the defense budget planning 
process are tightly connected to the current system. The introduction of a PPBS-like system 
would redesign the current structure, which should be different if a new system would be imple- 
mented. 
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Another problem would emerge in the management of the programs that involve major 
acquisition issues. Some of the programs developed by the services would establish the need for 
major procurements. In the US, the PPBS is tightly connected with the acquisition system. The 
Program Manager leads each major acquisition program. In Poland, there is neither such a posi- 
tion nor a career path established. 
As a new undertaking, introducing a modified version of the PPBS would generate many 
different problems. Although these problems would differ in their scope, they can be solved if an 
appropriate level of involvement among all important parties within the system emerged. The 
next section presents incentives that arise from the possibility of implementing a PPBS-like sys- 
tem that should be seriously considered when choosing the appropriate budgetary system for the 
Polish military forces. 
C.      PROSPECTS FOR IMPLEMENTING A PPBS-LIKE SYSTEM 
In spite of some problems, several incentives exist that support the implementation of a 
PPBS-like system in Poland. The most important incentive is fact that the goal of the PPBS is "to 
provide the best mix of forces, equipment and support attainable within the fiscal constraints." 
[Ref. 7] There are at least two important facts behind this. The first one is that all resources are 
always constrained. Naturally it is impossible to have a situation in which all needs can be satis- 
fied. Secondly, the best mix of forces can be attained only after careful analysis. For Poland, 
which has limited defense resources, a system that would accomplish the allocation of scarce re- 
sources is highly desirable. Particularly, introduction of a systematic approach, which the FYDP 
33
 More specific information on this issue can be found in the report: "Proposed Blueprint for Polish National Ac- 
quisition Strategy," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 25 October 2000. 
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presents, would greatly improve financial management and would create a long-term approach 
toward military planning. 
Long term planning is another benefit that emerges from implementing a PPBS-like sys- 
tem. This approach helps match the financial resources with the plans concerning national strat- 
egy. This approach also provides some economic and strategic advantages. They would include 
the financial consequences of alternate decisions, different alternatives that emerge from the 
planning process and the potential trade-offs among these alternatives. The last incentive would 
be to provide a way of thinking in terms of programs rather than input categories. Programs that 
formally realize the national strategy could gain more attention from the Parliament members 
because they could affect their constituents. 
This section provides an analysis of possible prospects emerging from a system based on 
the American PPBS. This section covers only two dimensions. The first dimension is the military 
advantage arising from the implementation. The second one covers the economic incentives for 
introducing a PPBS-like system. 
1.      Military Advantages of Implementing a PPBS-like System 
The main goal of the PPBS is to provide the best mix of forces within the budgetary con- 
straint to meet the US national and military objectives. Implementing a PPBS-like system and a 
core document of this system, the FYDP, would create a means for supporting a national strat- 
egy. 
a)        The Prospects Emerging from Adopting a FYDP-like Structure 
The PPBS process provides the Secretary of Defense with the set of programs that 
reflects the best mix of forces attainable within the fiscal constraints. The FYDP is a document 
that keeps all these programs together, reflects any changes in the external environment by al- 
terations made within programs. Even more, it translates the defense budget from inputs, such as 
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personnel and procurement, into forces. In case of the United States, these forces include strate- 
gic retaliation forces, airlift and sealift forces. Finally, the FYDP translates these forces into out- 
puts, which are measured by the number of targets destroyed or number of lives saved. The last 
forty years showed much proof of the effectiveness of such an approach. 
The first benefit of implementing a PPBS-like system in the Polish Ministry of 
National Defense would be creating a database similar to the FYDP. The Future Years Defense 
Programs is the heart of the PPBS process. According to the creators of the PPBS, creating Ma- 
jor Force Programs, as in the FYDP, presents the best approach for accomplishing the goals of 
the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Poland can take an approach 
similar to the original American FYDP when establishing the appropriate division into MFP-like 
programs. This division would not favor any particular service or governmental agency. On the 
contrary, the national strategy has the first priority. The services and other governmental agen- 
cies would have only one task—to meet the objectives of the national strategy. 
Another important incentive resulting from introducing a FYDP-like structure 
would be the fact that the FYDP covers an eleven-year period. In Poland, the period of coverage 
could be different, depending on the particular needs that would reflect local conditions, the ex- 
ternal environment and probably political trends within the state. However, whatever the length 
of the period would be, extending the programs into the future would allow the Minister of Na- 
tional Defense to determine when systems or forces should be canceled or extended for the next 
four years if there were any important reasons or needs for an output, which that system or force 
would provide. 
The fact that the FYDP was perceived from the very beginning as the best method 
for creating alternatives for the service programs is another positive benefit. By creating alterna- 
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tives and by considering them carefully, taking into consideration many different aspects (cost 
effectiveness, opportunity costs associated with particular programs or overall benefits for the 
nation or for the society), both the military and the civilian decision makers could ensure that the 
national defense obtains the best mix of forces within the fiscal constraints. For example, review- 
ing alternatives in this way would allow military decision makers to eliminate duplicative pro- 
grams, thus saving money. 
b)       Advantages Resulting from Introducing the Defense Planning Guidance 
The intent of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) is to guide the military ser- 
vices as they attempt to meet the goals established in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and 
the National Military Strategy (NMS), to underline issues of specific concern, and to determine 
departmental priorities. [Ref. 16] The form of this document changed recently from a more de- 
tailed and specified document related to particular programs to a more general document that left 
more space for the services for interpretation. Conducted effectively, with a sufficient commit- 
ment of high ranking officers from the Chancellery of the Minister of National Defense, such a 
process would greatly help translate the armed forces' vision, once it is shaped, by outlining par- 
ticular programs and leaving room for interpretations and innovations. 
Although the Minister of National Defense issues annually the Guidance of the 
Minister of National Defense for the Defense Budget Planning, this document does not translate 
the objectives of the Ministry of National Defense into meaningful programs. On the contrary, it 
articulates the main undertakings for organizational changes, R&D, acquisition of new equip- 
ment and systems, maintenance of equipment currently in use, investment in new facilities and 
maintenance of the current facilities, and training and retainment of personnel. Additionally, this 
document conveys limits on both expenditures and the number of positions for civilian and mili- 
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tary personnel for particular budget holders. Finally, it presents propositions for systemic 
changes. Adopting the DPG approach would establish the means of converting the objectives of 
the Ministry of National Defense into meaningful requirements that should be considered when 
formulating programs. The Strategic Planning Process would articulate and provide a necessary 
approach to create a DPG-like document. 
Finally, both a FYDP-like structure and a DPG-like document would significantly 
change how budgeting is now conducted in the Polish Ministry of National Defense. A clear 
translation of national strategy into a set of well-arranged Major Force Programs would conform 
any new program to the national strategy and to the objectives of the armed forces. The Polish 
Armed Forces would receive the best mix of forces matching the budget constraints. In addition, 
this mix would present the most effective and efficient set of programs. Each element of a par- 
ticular Major Force Program would be explained during a thorough review of the many options 
available and would be supported by well-articulated reasons for implementation. The next sub- 
section presents economic incentives for adopting a PPBS-like system. 
2.      Economic Incentives for Changing the System Currently in Use in Poland 
Implementing a system based on the American PPBS would create several economic in- 
centives. Presently one can observe the effort of the US government to improve financial man- 
agement within federal agencies. As an example, the Government Performance and Results Act 
of 1993 is used. It requires every governmental department or agency to present a strategic plan. 
Conducted properly, the strategic planning process should consider the mission of an organiza- 
tion, articulate the goals related to the mission, create objectives for achieving these goals, and 
finally establish measures that would help identify the degree of success in pursing the objectives 
set. 
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Particularly, introducing a database similar to the FYDP would allow the Ministry of Na- 
tional Defense to structure the National Strategy into major missions that would execute this 
strategy. From the economic perspective, this approach would generate several important bene- 
fits. These would include identifying the cost implications of alternative decisions and the alter- 
natives themselves and the trade-offs could be considered systematically. 
From the very beginning, the FYDP structure was intended to establish a mechanism for 
creating and shaping alternatives to the service programs. [Ref. 16] Then these alternatives 
would be integrated by making trade-offs intended to better shape overall product. The intention 
to focus on defense output would help solve problems associated with preferences of one pro- 
gram over another. 
a)        The Long-Term Planning 
Extending the FYDP for eleven years provides additional economic incentive. 
The FYDP approach helps focus the attention of decision makers on the long-term expenses of a 
particular program. Instead of concentrating on a down payment, they would consider the overall 
costs of a particular program when deciding whether or not to approve a program. Such a long- 
term approach to cost would avoid the situation in which an approved program would not be re- 
evaluated periodically. For example, the Air Force baseline extension procedure requires the 
Program Elements Monitors to chose programs that would be extended. Other programs that are 
not chosen for extension compete for the remaining scarce resources. 
Another opportunity is generated for the particular contractor for any program. In 
the case of the multi-year budgeting, the program spanning over an eleven-year period with a 
possibility of extending it further is a good opportunity for investing in a firm that might be in- 
terested in military contracts. The long-term approach provides a required level of certainty for 
84 
any private entrepreneur willing to sign the contact for goods or services. Each program would 
establish its own timeline of milestones. Detailed dates should be provided. These dates would 
give a legal base if any problems with implementation or development would occur. The case of 
the jet plane "Iryda" is a negative example of a program that was never finished. This plane was 
to be commissioned into service in the 1980s. To date, there are no Irydas flying in the Polish 
sky. The program, however, is still partially funded.34 This occurred due to the strong position of 
the unions. 
The idea of long-term planning would find an even better opportunity if the ma- 
jority of the government-owned factories in Poland which provide military equipment were pri- 
vatized. Examples in many western countries (the leading example is the United States) prove 
that many activities concerning military matters do not have to be necessarily conducted by the 
military forces themselves. Because of the different structure, private sector enterprises can do 
the same research or development project with a higher degree of effectiveness and efficiency. 
The military forces are another form of bureaucracy. One of the characteristics of the bureauc- 
racy is its unwillingness to change. Rules and regulations are the core of its existence Although 
they can be very efficient, military forces take a long time to adapt to a changing environment. 
Private firms can respond much more rapidly. 
Some services used by the Polish armed forces can be outsourced. The idea of 
outsourcing is quite popular among many US firms at the beginning of the twenty-first century.' 
Outsourcing can create significant savings for government because it does not require maintain- 
ing a large work force or necessary equipment. It is just another contract with the price agreed 
upon by both sides. 
' http://www.mofhet.gov.pl/bud2et panstwa/ustawa.shtml. 
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Adopting a long-term approach toward planning would require some measure- 
ments of achievement. Attention should be paid to what is being measured. If established and 
conducted thoroughly, the long-term planning approach would generate means of measurement 
that should concentrate on the outputs and outcomes of these outputs. This would allow for an 
effective measurement of the usefulness of a particular program or program element. A military 
organization may find it difficult to change a measurement system that is based on the effort un- 
dertaken and not on an outcome. A clear and common means of measurement for all services 
would help to create the basis for comparison of similar programs used by the different services. 
It would also help assess the usefulness of the program in a long-term. This assessment could be 
used as a reference while comparing or making choices between similar programs competing for 
the scarce resources. This is particularly important in the situation of Poland, where military 
forces face the situation of many urgent needs in different areas like modernizing the armed 
forces or allied commitments and limited resources to meet these needs. 
b)        The Strategic Approach toward the FYDP and Planning Process 
The best approach for introducing the FYDP and the best way of preparing and 
creating programs would be strategic planning. Strategic planning itself would create several in- 
centives and can be conducted in several ways. The first approach is called the "Synoptic Ap- 
proach." Another is called the "Strategic Issues Approach." 
The synoptic approach can be summarized as a conscious, rational planning effort 
by which top executives formulate the organization's goals, oversee their implementation, and 
measure their progress. At the same time, adjustments to the organization's goals are made as the 
external and internal environment that the organization is dealing with changes. [Ref. 17] Some- 
times this approach is called the "goals approach" because of the hierarchy of goals that cascades 
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down the organizational chart from very general goals at the corporate level into more detailed 
and specific goals at the operational level. 
The second approach, Strategic Issues Management, enables key executives to 
concentrate on key issues rather than comprehensive goals. By strategic issues one should under- 
stand a problem that any organization is facing. This problem should affect an organization and 
the most important aspect is that an organization should be able to do something positive about 
that. This approach contains ten steps which include: 
Initiate and agree upon a strategic planning process. 
Identify organizational mandates. 
Clarify organizational mission and values. 
Assess the organization's external and internal environment to identify "Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats"—SWOT analysis. 
Identify the strategic issues facing the organization. 
Formulate strategies to manage these issues. 
Review and adopt the strategic plans. 
Establish an effective organizational vision. 
Develop an effective implementation process. 
Reassess strategies and the strategic planning process. [Ref. 18] 
The Strategic Issues Management approach fits the environment of the Polish 
Ministry of National Defense better. This statement is supported by American experience in in- 
troducing the Government Performance and Results Act. Nancy Roberts points out several rea- 
sons why the synoptic approach does not fit governmental agencies within the United States. 
[Ref. 17] Many agencies exist within a politicized environment. In this kind of environment, one 
can distinguish many different stakeholders, often, with conflicting interests. This fact makes the 
synoptic approach almost impossible to apply. Because the synoptic approach is a conscious, ra- 
tional planning approach, it is difficult to satisfy the needs and expectations of all the stake- 
holders. 
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The Polish Ministry of National Defense exists within a situation where many 
stakeholders with different levels of power coexist and exercise influence. The multi-party po- 
litical arena creates a situation where different parties have different perceptions of the Polish 
military forces. On the one hand, in a case of constrained resources that are assigned to the Min- 
istry of National Defense, there are always parties that claim that the military forces receive too 
much funding and other social areas of governmental responsibility are being neglected. On the 
other hand, some parties present an opposing position. An example of this argument is seen in 
the case of setting the constant rate of the Polish GDP for the defense budget by the Plan of 
Modernization of the Armed Forces until year 2006, which is perceived by some politicians as 
favoring the military establishment. [Ref. 10] 
Let's examine some of the steps involved in the Strategic Issues Management 
Approach. The ten steps creating the process of strategic planning can be highly useful if ap- 
proached properly. The first step would allow high ranking decision makers within the MoND 
together with the Minister of National Defense to agree on the need for a new, more efficient 
planning system within the MoND. If there is no agreement on the kind of a planning process the 
leaders are going to follow, there is little chance for efficient planning at all. [Ref. 18] 
The second step seems to be particularly important. Clarifying organizational val- 
ues and missions for the MoND would help more than budgetary matters. Although the external 
environment (unemployment) still forces many young people to join the military service, after   ' 
graduating from military academies these officers find better career opportunities outside the 
MoND. Similarly, enlisted personnel, even though subject to the draft, also secure better oppor- 
tunities outside the MoND. Young people treat the compulsory military service as a penalty. It is 
hard, naturally, to develop any kind of commitment among such soldiers. However, the manage- 
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rial theory and human resource management theory state that if an organization clearly articu- 
lates and promotes its values and if these values meet the values and expectations of the work 
force, this helps to increase the commitment and efficiency of the employees. Employees com- 
mitted to a job, in this case, soldiers from the draft, mean greater savings, less waste, higher effi- 
ciency and effectiveness. 
The Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis, which is 
the next step, can create several opportunities for the military forces. The main goal of perform- 
ing a SWOT analysis is to assess the external and internal environment in which the organization 
exists. Several opportunities might help the Polish armed forces in conducting their mission. For 
example, introducing a PPBS-like system would help manage scarce resources that are assigned 
to the military forces. Another opportunity might stem from privatizing the governmental facto- 
ries that supply the majority of military needs. The SWOT analysis also helps identify the threats 
that an organization is facing. One of these threats might be a possibility of reducing the money 
spent on defense. 
If done thoroughly, the SWOT analysis provides the decision makers with a list of 
strengths and weaknesses in the organization. Additionally, the SWOT analysis identifies major 
stakeholders interested in an organization. A careful analysis of major stakeholders, and detect- 
ing how they assess organizational performance might be very helpful. Conducted on a regular 
basis, the SWOT analysis can be an excellent source of information about both the organization 
itself and the environment surrounding it. The latter can be particularly important when conduct- 
ing the planning phase of a PPBS-like system. 
Based on the SWOT analysis, the next step requires identifying strategic issues 
that the organization is facing. A strategic issue is a major problem that an organization is facing 
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day-to-day. This problem must affect the long-term existence of an organization and an organiza- 
tion must be able to do something positive about this problem. If an organization cannot do any- 
thing, the problem is not a strategic issue. Right now, several strategic issues can be identified. 
The first strategic issue would consider modernizing the Polish armed forces. Another issue 
could be associated with fulfilling Poland's commitment to NATO. These examples of strategic 
issues appear to be very important, especially because they are publicized on the official web 
page of the Polish armed forces.35 
Having identified strategic issues that the Polish Ministry of National Defense is 
facing, high-ranking decision makers from the MoND could next formulate strategies and plans 
to manage the strategic issues. This step would provide the decision makers with the list of pro- 
grams that should be undertaken if the objectives of the Polish armed forces were to be achieved. 
This step encompasses not only developing a particular program but also a detailed resource al- 
location. If well approached, this step could be implemented as a programming and budgeting 
phase of an adopted PPBS-like system. To be more comprehensive, the strategic plan develop- 
ment should be transferred to the services. This step of the strategic planning process is closely 
related with the next step, which is described below. 
Once both the strategies and plans are established and a consensus emerges 
among the major stakeholders and decision makers involved in the planning process, the Minis- 
ter of National Defense and then the Parliament would review of the developed strategies. The 
only difference that is highly important in this step concerns the attention that the organization 
should pay to how success is measured. Clearly, a strategic planning process pays a significant 
amount of attention to the output of an action. The means of measurement should be directed to- 
35
 http://www.wp.mil.pl/mon/2 4.html 
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ward output and outcomes not toward efforts undertaken. Therefore, developers of the strategies 
should pay significant attention to the manner in which they define means of measure. 
A process of reviewing and adopting strategic plans can be associated with the 
POM review process. To be more detailed and not overwhelming for the Minister of National 
Defense, several stages should be added, in which higher-level Budget Holders can examine the 
strategic plans developed by their subordinates. The final review would involve the Level II 
Budget Holders. The next step in reviewing the strategic plans would be examining them from 
the financial point of view. The Budget Estimate Submission could be assessed during this proc- 
ess. 
Having established and approved the strategic plans, the military planners to- 
gether with other major stakeholders, would be able to establish an organizational vision, which 
entails the next step in the Strategic Issues Management process. The vision should reflect the 
stage of the armed forces that major stakeholders would like the armed forces to achieve. This 
vision should encompass the most crucial aspects and issues associated with national defense and 
national strategy and the security of the state. If it is clear, the vision could be easily understood 
and adopted by all soldiers and civilian personnel. An organizational vision that can be adopted 
by all organizational members can help increase productivity and increase the commitment of the 
members of the organization. It would be significant and valuable if each service had its own vi- 
sion. 
The implementation process, which follows establishment of the organizational 
vision, would incorporate a timeline of the established processes. With a clearly defined means 
of measurement, the programs themselves would be a good way of achieving the goals included 
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in the national strategy and the goals in the vision of the armed forces and each individual 
branch. 
The last step in the Strategic Issues Management process considers an evaluation 
of strategies and plans implemented. This stage would need to establish the means by which the 
performance of the Polish armed forces could be measured. Once introduced, the plans and 
strategies, if measured efficiently, could provide enough data for the decision makers to evaluate 
the possibility of either phasing out or extending programs. As mentioned earlier, these means of 
measurement should concentrate on outputs and outcomes of the process, not on the inputs. A 
clear process should be established by which different services could be compared and different 
programs assessed. High-ranking officers and generals from the Central Institutions of the Polish 
Ministry of National Defense should be involved in this process. 
One point is quite important. Once established, the strategic planning process 
does not have to be started from the first point. It appears that several organizations could start 
from different steps. Nothing is wrong with this approach. Only one aspect is crucial: The or- 
ganization has to do something positive about strategic issues. 
The next chapter presents conclusions and recommendations for the possible im- 
plementation of a PPBS-like system in Poland. 
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V.      CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.      CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis addressed the issue of adopting a PPBS-like system in the Polish Ministry of 
National Defense. The main goal was to identify the possible problems and prospects if the Pol- 
ish Ministry of National Defense decided to implement such a system. 
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System is a system that for many years has 
provided US military decision makers with an approach that enabled them to create the best mix 
of forces required to meet the goals of both the National Security Strategy and the National Mili- 
tary Strategy. The intent of the creators of the PPBS was to establish a system that would first 
define the goals that the military forces would pursue. Next, the necessary programs by which 
the services would attain these goals would be determined. These programs would be created by 
the services. Once created, the programs undergo a process of review by the OSD. The goal of 
the review process is to assess the usefulness of these programs and to compare them with 
alternatives proposed by the OSD. Selected programs should present the best approach toward 
achieving the goals established. After review and deciding which programs are acceptable, the 
funding requirements of each program are developed by the services and reviewed by the OSD. 
The SECDEF makes final decisions on programs and funding. 
The comparison of the two budgetary systems shows that there are several significant dif- 
ferences between them. Particularly important are those resulting from the differences in the 
laws. By law, the defense budget of the Polish Ministry of National Defense is required to be 
compatible with the other parts of the State Budget. Because of this fact, the defense budget clas- 
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sifications are derivatives of the general classification that is imposed on other Level I Budget 
Holders by the Minister of Finance. The defense budget resulting from the imposition of the 
above compatibility requirement is just the subject division, where subjects are the different 
Level II Budget Holders within the MoND. On the contrary, the US defense budget presents a 
division of resources that translates the objectives of the National Security Strategy and the Na- 
tional Military Strategy into a set of Major Force Programs which are expected to meet these ob- 
jectives. 
Another difference stems from the fact that the President of the United States is legally 
obliged to submit the draft of the federal budget to the Congress. He exercises control over the 
process of preparing the draft. After Congress has made changes to his budget submission, the 
President either approves the parts of the budget or exercises the veto power. The President of 
the Republic of Poland represents the last step in the process of creating the Polish State Budget. 
He can either approve or reject the State Budget; however, he does not control the process of its 
creation. This difference results from the hybrid character of the parliamentary system in Poland. 
Other differences result from the different scope of the national interest. The United 
States is the major power in the international system. This fact is reflected by forces that are dif- 
ferent from those within the Polish military. An example is the aircraft carrier battle group. This 
type of force is included in the first Major Force Program of the U.S. defense budget, called the 
Strategic Force Program. The Future Years Defense Programs translates and expresses the major 
power interest of the US. Sustaining the Strategic Force Program clearly conveys the willingness 
of the United States to react quickly and decisively to different events in different parts of the 
globe that might endanger US interests. 
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By contrast, the national interests of the Republic of Poland focuses primarily on the re- 
gional matters that affect the country. Although there are some initiatives like the Wyshegrad 
Triangle, Polish defense objectives are quite different when compared to those of the United 
States. 
Closely associated with the different scope of the national interest are the structures of the 
military forces. For example, there is no equivalent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Polish mili- 
tary forces. Although the Chief of the General Staff in Poland can be compared to the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the U.S., the scope of responsibilities is quite different. The Uni- 
fied Commanders can be used as another example of the different structures of the two armed 
forces. Although the Military District Commanders can be compared to the Unified Command- 
ers, different budgetary obligations apply. 
Despite many differences, there are many attractive prospects for implementing a PPBS- 
like system in Poland. This thesis focused only on two dimensions, military and economic. Sev- 
eral military advantages would emerge from implementing such a system. The most important is 
that implementation would result in the set of programs that would translate the national strategy 
into military means of achievement. In particular, introducing a FYDP-like set of programs 
would express the translation of the strategies into programs. Another positive incentive would 
be a long-term approach to the programs established. Next, implementing this kind of system 
would provide the military forces with the best mix of forces attainable within the fiscal con- 
straints. 
Introducing a Defense Planning Guidance-like document would establish a means of ex- 
pressing the goals and translating the vision of the Ministry of National Defense into meaningful 
recommendations that would establish the basis for the services to develop their individual pro- 
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grams. Further, both a FYDP-like structure and a DPG-like document would establish the man- 
ner by which the programs could be created to reflect the national interests and then to assess 
program conformance with the goals established by the national strategy. 
The major economic incentive resulting from implementing a PPBS-like system that the 
author perceives is the strategic planning approach to the whole system. The strategic planning 
approach toward the PPBS generates several advantages. They include the need for agreeing 
upon the way the planning process should be conducted, the assessment of the external and in- 
ternal environment, accomplished during the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
Analysis (SWOT analysis). The next advantage would be the benefit presented by long-term 
planning. The FYDP spans an eleven-year period. For Poland, the structure does not have to 
have the same range. However, a range longer than five years would create programs more inter- 
esting for contractors. Another positive fact would result from establishing a real means of 
evaluating the achievement of the goals established by the national strategy. 
B.      RECOMMENDATIONS 
First, the author recommends implementing a PPBS-like system in the MoND. The im- 
plementation of a PPBS-like system would allow for effective management of the scarce re- 
sources provided to the military forces. Furthermore, a PPBS-like system would enable the Min- 
ister of the National Defense and high-ranking military decision makers to translate the national 
strategy into a set of programs by which these goals would be achieved. The outcome of the 
process would present the best mix of forces attainable within the fiscal constraints. Finally, im- 
lementing a PPBS-like system would generate several economic incentives and advantages, not 
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to mention the long-term approach or savings resulting from the outsourcing of some services 
that are now conducted by the military itself. 
The manner in which activities within a PPBS-like system are conducted is highly impor- 
tant for the success of such a system. The author recommends the strategic planning approach. 
Among the many advantages of this approach, perhaps the most important is an assessment of 
the external environment. Major stakeholders concerned about military matters in Poland would 
be able to contribute significantly to the efficiency and effectiveness of the management of the 
scarce resources. Particularly, attention must be paid to the means by which these stakeholders 
measure the results of the military activities to establish a common language between the mili- 
tary and stakeholders. 
Second, the author recommends introduction of a FYDP-like structure that would estab- 
lish the means for achieving the goals of the national strategy. As discussed earlier, the adoption 
of the FYDP structure as it looks in the American PPBS system is impossible because of many 
legal and structural differences between the Polish and the American military forces. The author 
suggests that a FYDP-like structure should reflect the actual needs and requirements of the Pol- 
ish military forces. Major Force Programs or other major elements of a FYDP-like structure 
should have their roots in the national interests and strategy. They should reflect the structure of 
the Polish military forces and local conditions as they exist in Poland. 
The author is aware of the fact that changing the law is a very difficult and time- 
consuming process. However, creating a FYDP-like structure should be accompanied by legally 
binding acts establishing rules for transforming that structure's elements into the draft of the 
budget that is compatible with other parts of the State Budget. Transforming that structure into 
the budget draft appears, to the author, to be the biggest problem for introducing a PPBS-like 
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system in Poland. However, to fulfill the requirement for compatibility, this issue must be re- 
solved. A thorough discussion among parties and players involved in the process should be con- 
ducted while assigning major programs and program elements to particular Budget Holders. 
The FYDP database and a similar format should be adopted for a FYDP-like structure. 
Depending upon the necessity, times when that database would be "locked" should be estab- 
lished. To avoid any mistakes and to provide users with accurate information, this rule should be 
strictly enforced. 
The above recommendations, in the author's opinion, are crucial for implementation of a 
PPBS-like system in Poland. Implementing such a system would not be an easy task, however, if 
approached with a high level of commitment and professionalism it is quite feasible. It is rec- 
ommended that the Minister of National Defense should coordinate the whole process of chang- 
ing the current process. He should establish the change of process as a major priority during his 
tenure. 
A third recommendation is the implementation of a document similar to the Defense 
Planning Guidance. This document would provide the services with guidance from the top level 
of the Ministry of National Defense. As a major document establishing priorities for the services, 
a DPG-like document could be used as the basis for other plans to be established. These would 
include long-term, mid-term and short-term plans. Another advantage is that this document 
would allow for changes as the external environment changes on an annual basis. 
The final recommendation concerns the planning process. The author views the adoption 
of the Joint Strategic Planning System as impossible in Poland. There are several reasons for 
that. The first and most important is the fact the MoND does not have a structure that would re- 
semble the Unified Commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While similarities can be found 
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between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the General Staff, the scope of their responsibilities is quite 
different. The author recommends that the Chief of the General Staff should be responsible for 
the process preceding the issuance of the Defense Planning Guidance. Additionally, the respon- 
sibility for reviewing the proposals from the services should be granted to the Chief of the Gen- 
eral Staff. The author perceives the creation of a process similar to the Joint Strategic Planning 
System as inevitable and required if an adopted system similar to the American PPBS is to suc- 
ceed. The proper timeline reflecting the legal requirements for submitting the draft of the defense 
budget should be established. 
This thesis provides many avenues for further studies. These would include the format of 
a FYDP-like structure and a detailed description of the responsibilities of the bodies shaping the 
outcome of a PPBS-like system. Another possibility for further study might be the measures by 
which achievement of the goals established by the national interest and national strategy could be 
measured. Finally, further studies could try to assess the possible saving if a PPBS-like system 
were implemented. 
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